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Seven years into the peace following Sri Lanka’s civil war between the Sinhalese 
and Tamils, society remains divided. Yet, a permanent peace between both communities 
is essential to the nation. This thesis examines the prospects for a post-conflict durable 
reconciliation process in Sri Lanka that can create a lasting solution to the Sinhalese–
Tamil dispute. It argues that if the joint leadership of the Sinhalese and Tamils embrace 
accommodation, tolerance, and compromise, then a meaningful reconciliation may follow 
in Sri Lanka. Similarly, by establishing an internationally engineered Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission to examine the alleged human rights violations at the last 
stage of the conflict, Sri Lanka may complicate the reconciliation process and may even 
further polarize the Sinhalese and Tamils. To support these arguments, this study 
evaluates the core issues and the past reconciliation efforts by different stakeholders in 
the conflict. Additionally, this thesis explores the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission as a case study to find its relevance in the Sri Lankan context. Subsequently, 
the study identifies the prevailing obstacles to the reconciliation process after analyzing 
the perceptions of the Sinhalese, the Tamils, the Muslims, and the international 
community. Finally, it reveals that a degree of uncertainty overshadows the ongoing 
reconciliation process mainly due to the absence of a meaningful dialogue among the 
Sinhalese and the Tamils in the country. 
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After fighting a three-decades-long armed conflict, the Sri Lankan government 
defeated the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in May 2009. However, the 
government’s victory came at a colossal cost for all parties to the conflict. As a result of 
this extended conflict, approximately 100,000 Sinhalese and Tamils died, more than 
150,000 people in the same communities were either maimed or disabled, and scores of 
people were internally displaced.1 According to the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR), “some 140,000 Sri Lankan refugees live in 65 countries 
throughout the world today.”2 While many Sri Lankans living abroad worry that 
“conditions in the country are not yet right for their return, the UN Refugee Agency … 
has assisted more than 4,500 refugees to voluntarily return to their homeland.”3 
Therefore, the end of the conflict opens a window of opportunity for both parties to 
achieve a lasting peaceful solution through a meaningful reconciliation process. 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION  
Seven years into the peace following Sri Lanka’s civil war between the Sinhalese 
and the Tamils, society remains divided. Yet, a permanent peace between both 
communities is essential to the nation. This thesis examines the prospects for a durable 
reconciliation process in post-conflict Sri Lanka that could create a lasting solution to the 
Sinhalese–Tamil dispute. This thesis also explores ways in which stakeholders in the 
conflict might be more effectively engaged to formulate a lasting peace. This study 
evaluates the prevailing obstacles to the reconciliation process and proposes a viable 
framework within a positive working environment for both Sinhala and Tamil 
communities to establish a durable reconciliation process.  
                                                 
1 “Reconciliation in Sri Lanka: Harder than Ever,” International Crisis Group, July 18, 2011, accessed 
May 10, 2016, http://www.iccnow.org/documents/209_Reconciliation_in_Sri_Lanka_-
_Harder_than_Ever.pdf. 




The primary research question addressed is: How can the stakeholders in the 
conflict engage effectively in a long-term reconciliation process in Sri Lanka? Against 
this backdrop, the central research question raises two additional questions for 
consideration. First, what are the existing issues among the stakeholders that prevent 
progress in the reconciliation process? Second, what is the viable framework for creating 
a favorable environment for Sinhala and Tamil communities to engage in a meaningful 
reconciliation process? 
B. IMPORTANCE 
Undoubtedly, the biggest challenge in post-conflict Sri Lanka is to achieve 
permanent peace in the country. Although there were many peace initiatives that took 
shape in the country, none of these efforts had made substantial progress towards a 
permanent solution.4 Scholars and policymakers suggest that the reconciliation process is 
an essential element to build lasting peace in societies;5 hence, this thesis examines this 
process in the Sri Lankan context. Therefore, an examination of a lasting reconciliation 
process in Sri Lanka is important for a number of reasons. First, a reconciliation process 
through a national harmony among Sri Lanka’s ethnic groups could create a politically 
stable country with better economic, social, and security prospects. Thus, this paper aims 
to formulate a viable framework for a lasting reconciliation process in the country. At the 
same time, this study would allow the policymakers, politicians, civil society actors, and 
stakeholders to identify the significant factors that are currently hampering the forward 
movement of the reconciliation process.  
Second, many reconciliation processes practiced around the world have been 
conducted after internationally mediated negotiations between the stakeholders in the 
conflict.6 However, in the Sri Lankan context, it is the first time that a country is adopting 
                                                 
4 K. Sarveswaram, “Political Challenges: A Tamil Perspective” in Post Conflict Sri Lanka (New 
Delhi: Vij Books, 2012), 36. 
5 David Bloomfield, T. Barnes, and L. Huyse, ed. Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: A Handbook 
(Stockholm, Sweden: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2003), IV, accessed 
May 12, 2016, http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pdf/Reconciliation-After-Violent-Conflict-A-
Handbook-Full-English-PDF.pdf. 
6 Ibid., 41. 
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a reconciliation process after a decisive military victory over one party to the conflict. 
Therefore, the tools provided in this study will assist international institutions and United 
States government during future reconciliation efforts in nations of ongoing conflict such 
as Syria, Ukraine, and Iraq.  
Next, this thesis explores the possibility of the re-emergence of the conflict in the 
absence of a meaningful reconciliation process between the Sinhalese and the Tamils. 
Therefore, it will further assist the politicians of both communities and the military 
leadership in identifying the gaps in the ongoing reconciliation process.  
Finally, the comparison of the South African reconciliation process will assist Sri 
Lankan policymakers and politicians in identifying the compatibility of this model to the 
country’s own situation.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
As internal conflicts intensify during the 21st century, peace brokers around the 
world seek answers to one particular question: How to create domestic and international 
strategies to overcome challenges in the peacebuilding process?7 To answer this question, 
it is important to first understand the long- and short-term measures in peacebuilding 
efforts. Stephan Baranyi, a prolific writer on the subject, identifies disarmament, 
demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), along with security sector reforms, as short-
term measures and human rights protection and the reconciliation process as long-term 
measures for sustainable peace.8 In Baranyi’s book, The Paradoxes of Peacebuilding 
Post 9/11, John Paul Lederach argues that the “ultimate goal of peacebuilding should be 
‘sustainable reconciliation’ namely, broadly based, self-regenerating social process 
address the proximate and underlying causes of enmity.”9 Additionally, scholars who 
study conflict resolution state: 
It [conflict resolution] explores the causes of the conflict, particularly 
causes in the form of unmet or threatened needs for identity, security, 
                                                 
7 Stephan Baranyi, ed. The Paradoxes of Peacebuilding Post 9/11 (Vancouver, Toronto: UBC, 2008), 9. 
8 Ibid., 12. 
9 Ibid., 9. 
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recognition, autonomy, and justice. It seeks solutions responsive to the 
needs of both sides through active engagement in joint problem solving. 
Hence, agreements achieved through conflict resolution-unlike 
compromises achieved through a bargaining process brokered or imposed 
by third parties-are likely to engender the two parties’ long-term 
commitment to the outcome to transform their relationship.10  
In this context, these scholars identify the reconciliation process as “a 
consequence of successful conflict resolution”; thus, it is an integral part of the conflict 
resolution process that can later be used as the means to achieve the reconciliation.11 
Interestingly, much of the argument surrounding the conduct of the reconciliation process 
is complex and has a wide range of influence over its results.12  
While some scholars agree that “no handy road map” exists for reconciliation, 
they have broadened the concept and expanded upon it in different ways. Further, the 
definition and scope of the reconciliation create ambiguity in academia; thus, most 
scholars argue against a one-size-fits-all solution to the process. According to 
Bloomfield, Barnes, and Huyse in their landmark book, Reconciliation After Violent 
Conflict: A Handbook, “Reconciliation is never a theoretical matter, but always happens 
in a specific context.”13 In retrospect, the reconciliation process starts in a post-conflict 
situation when “war has ended, a settlement has been reached, and a new regime is 
struggling to construct a new society out of the ashes of the old.”14 So how should these 
governments build this new society?  
Bloomfield et al. emphasize that “the best form of post-conflict government is a 
democratic one.”15 The book further argues that, “democracy is a system for managing 
                                                 
10 Herbert C. Kelman, “Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation: A Social Psychological Perspective 
on Ending Violent Conflict between Identity Groups,” Landscape of Violence, 2010, 3, accessed May 07, 
2016, http://scholarworks.umass.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=lov. 
11 Ibid., 2–3. 
12 Bloomfield, Barnes, and Huyse, Reconciliation after Violent Conflict, 5. 
13 Ibid., 10–18. 
14 Ibid., 12. 
15 Ibid., 10. 
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differences without recourse to violence”16; thus, it manages the conflicts in a divided 
society. The authors further state that once the resolution for the conflict is reached, “[It] 
requires not new or reformed government structures that have not eradicated the 
differences over which the conflict was fought, but rather structures that are designed, 
through a negation process, to manage those differences peacefully.” However, 
Bloomfield et al. underline a “minimum degree of cooperation”17 among the parties to 
the conflicts as a prerequisite for a firm democratic structure. Meanwhile, the authors 
identify “obstacles” to negotiate in order to establish this minimum cooperation in a post-
conflict society. They describe how these obstacles of “antagonism, distrust, disrespect, 
and hatred”18 could be overcome by solving the issues of the past relationships and 
violence of these parties (root causes). Therefore, Bloomfield et al. state, “Reconciliation 
is the process for doing exactly that.”19 So, how do we define reconciliation? 
Considering the complexity of the Sri Lankan issue, it might be prudent to use 
Karen Brounéus’ definition of reconciliation: “Reconciliation is a societal process that 
involves mutual acknowledgment of past suffering and the changing of destructive 
attitudes and behavior into constructive relationships toward sustainable peace.”20 This 
basically means that government must make a meaningful effort to build trust among the 
parties to the conflict. Therefore, reconciliation needs to integrate “top-level leaders such 
as politicians, middle-level leaders such as religious officials, and grassroots level 
institutions represented by community leaders” in order to achieve a sustainable peace.21  
John Paul Lederach suggests three different approaches for peacebuilding with 
reference to three levels of leadership: top down, middle-range, and bottom up. 
                                                 
16 Bloomfield, Barnes, and Huyse, Reconciliation after Violent Conflict, 10. 
17 Ibid.,11. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid., 12. 
20 Karen Brounéus, “Reconciliation—Theory and Practice for Development Cooperation,” The 
Department for Cooperation with Non-Governmental Organizations and Humanitarian Assistance, 2003, 
20, accessed May 10, 2016, http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/66/66768_1reconciliation---theory-and-
practice.pdf. 
21 Baranyi, The Paradoxes, 10. 
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According to the scholar, the top down approach model is built on “a hierarchical, as well 
as a monolithic, power structure”22; thus, the sustainability of the foundation of this 
approach is dependent primarily on the negotiating level of the leadership. However, 
Lederach argues that the agreement of this approach “[would] have to be relevant to and 
capable of practical implementation at the local level.”23 In his second leadership 
domain, Lederach identifies three “not yet developed” but parallel approaches under the 
middle-range peacebuilding effort: “problem-solving workshops, conflict resolution 
training, and development of peace commissions.”24 As a result, these approaches help to 
establish relationships and build skill-based infrastructure for the peacebuilding process. 
In his third approach, Lederach identifies the bottom-up approach as more challenging 
than the other two approaches. This difficulty owes to two things: the magnitude of the 
population involved and the fact that these people seek basic needs as a priority rather 
than a conflict resolution or a peace process. However, he insists that this approach brings 
both parties to the conflict at the local level to discuss their past differences and come to 
mutual agreements in order to build cooperation.25 
In the Sri Lankan context, Brounéus’ definition broadly addresses every party to 
the conflict and highlights the necessity of building a relationship among these groups. It 
recognizes the past sufferings and responses to the victims in order to achieve a lasting 
peace. Bloomfield et al. describe this whole concept as, “it [reconciliation] is a process 
through which a society moves from a divided past to a shared future,”26 which further 
clarifies his idea of a “new society.”27  
                                                 
22 John Paul Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Society (Washington, 
DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1997), 44. 
23 Ibid., 44–46. 
24 Ibid., 46–50. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Bloomfield, Barnes, and Huyse, Reconciliation after Violent Conflict, 12. 
27 Ibid., 12. 
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Lederach amplifies Brounéus overarching concept of building relationships 
among the adversaries as a core concept in the whole process.28 Lederach maintains, 
“The traumas of the past and the hopes for the future must be formulated and brought 
together by discussing the issues of truth, forgiveness, justice, and peace.”29 The author 
further states that “these principal foundations are essential for the task of guiding, 
building, and maintaining a healing process where each party learns to understand and 
respect one another for the common good.” Strictly speaking, these principles can be 
considered the foundational stones to build a united future, and, in the context of Sri 
Lanka, one of peace. 
In response to Lederach’s argument, some scholars consider “forgiveness” a 
separate aspect from the reconciliation process that “could undermine the desire for 
justice by victims.”30 Further, scholars argue that “some deeds may for the individual 
survivor be unforgivable—and that it is critical that survivors are never implicitly or 
explicitly expected to forgive”;31 this stance limits the possibility of confidence building 
among the rivals because it constitutes the core aspect of the reconciliation process.  
In contrast, all scholars “writing from a theological perspective do include 
forgiveness in the process of reconciliation.”32 In the Catholic organization Carita’s 
handbook, Working for Reconciliation, it states, “Forgiveness is at the heart of 
reconciliation.”33 In addition, on reconciliation Lord Buddha preaches that, “When you 
                                                 
28 John Paul Lederach, Preparing for Peace, Conflict Transformation across Culture (Syracuse, NY: 
Syracuse University, 1995), 21. 
29 Lederach, Preparing for Peace, 14. 
30 G. Raymond, S. J. Helmick, and R. Petersen, Forgiveness and Reconciliation (Harrisburg, PA: 
Temple Foundation Press, 2002), 21. 
31 Brandon Hamber, Past Imperfect: Dealing with the Past in Northern Ireland and Societies in 
Transition (London: INCORE/UU, 1998), 16. 
32 For examples see Nigel Biggar, Burying the Past: Making Peace and Doing Justice after Civil 
Conflict (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2001); C John Paul Lederach, The Journey 
toward Reconciliation,(Scottsdale, PA.: Herald Press, 1999,); Desmond Tutu, No Future Without 
Forgiveness (New York: Doubleday, 1999). 
33 Brian Starken, ed., Working for Reconciliation: A Caritas Handbook (Vatican City: Caritas 
Internationalis, 1999), 4. 
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forgive me for harming you, you decided not to retaliate, to seek no revenge.”34 
Therefore, a lasting peace is possible between divided societies through reconciliation 
based on forgiveness. However, “individual forgiveness is a personal process and 
decision, based on a person’s own sentiments regarding the past as well as issues such as 
morality, responsibility, punishment, and empathy.”35 Human rights activists believe that 
truth and justice are necessary to solve the issues of the past.  
As professor Daniel Bar-Tal emphasizes, “Justice is indispensable for 
reconciliation.”36 According to Brounéus, there are two kinds of justice involved in the 
reconciliation process: retributive justice and restorative justice.37 While the 
reconciliation process adapted the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in South 
Africa to bring justice to victims through restorative justice, it also supported the 
retributive justice system [police, prisons and formal legal institutions] to prosecute and 
punish the perpetrators for severe crimes.38 Therefore, “those who see forgiveness as an 
important feature of reconciliation do not urge to forget, but to forgive the past in order to 
move forward together.”39 Thereby, governments will not stand a chance for granting a 
blanket of amnesty for perpetrators with crimes against humanity. 
Since every string attached to the reconciliation process works in tandem, 
reconciliation cannot be considered a remote practice but “both a goal—something to 
                                                 
34 Eds, Auguest 21, 2009, “Buddha on Forgiveness, Reconciliation, and Right and Wrong,” Queens 
and Bees Blog, May 13, 2016, https://califia.wordpress.com/2009/08/21/buddha-on-forgiveness-
reconciliation-and-right-wrong. 
35 Brounéus, Reconciliation—Theory and Practice, 19. 
36 Daniel Bar-Tal, “From Intractable Conflict through Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation: 
psychological Analysis,” in Political Psychology, December 2000, 21. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/
10.1111/0162-895X.00192/abstract.  
37 “Retributive justice, also called criminal, procedural, or legalistic justice, focuses on crime as the 
violation of law. Crime is, one could say, a matter between the perpetrator and the state. Restorative justice, 
referred to as transitional or reparative justice, focuses on crime as a conflict between individuals as well as 
on the injuries crime inflicts on all parties: the victim, the perpetrator and the society. The interest of the 
justice system is here to reconcile and heal conflictive relationships in order to end the vicious circle of 
crime, revenge, and recurring crime.” Brounéus, Reconciliation—Theory and Practice, 19. 
38 Ibid., 31. 
39 Raymond, Helmick, and Petersen, Forgiveness and Reconciliation, 32 
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achieve—and a process—a means to achieve that goal.”40 Bloomfield further explains 
that the ultimate achievement of this “goal” is the lasting peace, but he emphasizes that 
the “process” is long-term and “it [reconciliation] takes its own time: its pace cannot be 
dictated.”41 Similarly, Andrew Rigby explains four stages of this process “1.) Securing 
the peace, 2.) Uncovering the truth, 3.) Approaching justice, and 4.) Putting the past in its 
proper place.”42 This laborious process further justifies the length of the reconciliation to 
take root in the society. Therefore, “reconciliation must be seen as a long-term process 
that may take decades or generations. If not, reconciliation based on ambiguity will not 
last.”43  
In another argument, Luc Huyse claims that the “goal” of the reconciliation 
“prevents, once and for all, the use of the past as the seed of renewed conflict.”44 Huyse 
further explains that, “reconciliation can be thought of as containing two parts: a 
‘backward looking’ operation, which encompasses the healing and repairing of past 
injustices, and a ‘forward-looking’ operation, which encourages the moving on of 
individuals and society to a new development with peaceful dialogue and ‘adequate 
sharing of power.’”45 As described before, reconciliation is a laborious process that 
involves a number of actors in different stages and in different contexts. Huyse identifies 
three fundamental steps towards reconciliation: “1.) Replacing fear by non-violent 
coexistence, 2.) When fear no longer rules: building confidence and trust, 3.) 
Engendering empathy.”46  
To Huyse, “peaceful coexistence, trust and empathy cannot develop within a 
politically marginalized or economically uneven society.”47 Therefore, this process must 
                                                 
40 Raymond, Helmick, and Petersen, Forgiveness and Reconciliation,10–18. 
41 Bloomfield, Barnes, and Huyse, Reconciliation after Violent Conflict, 10. 
42 Andrew Rigby, Justice and Reconciliation after Violence (Boulder, Colorado: L., Rienner, 2001), 
51. 
43 Bloomfield, Barnes, and Huyse, Reconciliation after Violent Conflict, 28. 
44 Ibid., 31. 
45 Ibid., 19–34. 
46 Huyse, Process of Reconciliation, 32. 
47 Ibid. 
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be based on “the recognition of the essential codes of democracy” and “a just socio-
economic order,” namely the “gradual devolution of power, the creation of a just society 
where human rights are respected and the willingness to hold accountability for both the 
past and the future.”48 As for the economic parity, it is important for the victims to 
rebuild life and actively participate in the economic development process in post-conflict 
countries. Additionally, some scholars suggest that in the absence of a just political and 
economic system, reoccurrence of the conflict could be inevitable.49 Zimbabwe, once a 
poster boy of reconciliation process, failed due to increased economic disparity among 
Africans and white settlers.50  
Meanwhile, Bloomfield et al. argue that, “the people of a post-conflict society are 
sometimes impatient, as if coexistence, trust and empathy can come swiftly. Such timing, 
expecting too much too soon—especially if it is proclaimed as official policy— is 
doomed to fail.”51 Considering all these aspects, Brandon Hamber and Hugo van der 
Merwe provide five important aspects for the successful process of reconciliation: “1.) 
Developing a shared vision of an interdependent and fair society, 2.) Acknowledging 
dealing with the past, 3.) Building a positive relationship, 4.) Significant cultural and 
attitudinal changes, 5.) Substantial social and political changes.”52  
This formula has “once been criticized as likely irrelevant and problematic in the 
Sri Lanka situation.”53 Nevertheless, this method provides an impetus and a direction for 
the sagging momentum of the Sri Lankan reconciliation process. Further, to achieve 
success in Hamber and van der Merwe’s process, it is critical to achieve trust among the 
stakeholders in the conflict in order to rebuild the broken relationship among the 
                                                 
48 Huyse, Process of Reconciliation, 21. 
49 Brounéus “Reconciliation—Theory and Practice,” 23–24. 
50 Huyse, Process of Reconciliation, 21–22. 
51 Bloomfield, Barnes, and Huyse, Reconciliation after Violent Conflict, 18. 
52 Brandon Hamber and Hugo van der Merwe, “What Is This Thing Called Reconciliation?” Centre 
for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation: Vol. 1, 1998, accessed May 21, 2016, http://www.csvr.org.za/
wits/articles/artrcbh.htm.  
53 M.Thaheer, P. Peiris, and K. Pathiraja, Reconciliation in Sri Lanka: Voices from Former War Zones 
(Colombo, Sri Lanka: International Centre for Ethnic Studies, 2013), 16. 
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Sinhalese and the Tamils. Additionally, while acknowledging the past; it is imperative to 
address the core issues of the conflict, which is equally important in the Sri Lankan 
reconciliation process. Thereby, this process may become a foundation for a lasting 
reconciliation process in Sri Lanka, considering how both parties to the conflict play a 
blame game on each other while dragging their feet on the urge for a sustainable 
reconciliation process in a war-ravaged country.  
So far, the literature addressing a successful reconciliation process makes two 
arguments: in a postwar country, democracy provides a conducive environment for 
reconciliation, since democracy is managing the conflict; and minimum cooperation 
among the parties to the conflict is a prerequisite to achieve a firm democratic system in a 
post-conflict society which a reconciliation process could achieve by addressing issues of 
the past. However, these arguments have not explicitly addressed the effect of external 
influences on the reconciliation process, such as other ethnic groups, international 
institutions, diaspora, social activist groups, community leaders, media, and the 
nationalist religious or social ideological parties. Brayan states that the success and 
failure of a peacebuilding process is dependent on international engagement and the 
presence or absence of “spoilers.”54 Therefore, this thesis focuses on these gapsin the 
ongoing aspects of the reconciliation process, since these factors are highly significant in 
the Sri Lankan context. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Considering the complex nature of the Sri Lankan issue and the reconciliation 
process to follow, any meaningful reconciliation attempt will not last without building 
trust, confidence, and a relationship among the parties to the conflict, mainly the 
Sinhalese and the Tamils. As the international communities increased demands for an 
impartial inquiry into the Human Rights Violations of both the LTTE and Sri Lankan 
security forces became a central theme of the post-conflict peace process, a transparent 
inquiry could pave the way for obtaining justice for victims of both the Sinhala and Tamil 
                                                 
54 “Spoilers” are, namely, powerful actors opposed to peace building on the ground. For more 
information about spoilers, study “The Impact of Spoilers on Peace Process and Peacebuilding,” in Policy 
Briefing, 2006, accessed May 24, 2016, http://collections.unu.edu/view/UNU:3095.  
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communities. However, without addressing the fundamental causes of the Sinhala-Tamil 
problem, a war crime investigation alone will not facilitate the reconciliation process in 
Sri Lanka. It is possible that an inquiry could further alienate these two communities. 
Finally, a substantial social and political change in the conflict is necessary for a lasting 
solution to the issue, and it may only be possible through the devolution of power 
accepted by both the Sinhala and Tamil communities. 
Against this backdrop, this thesis formulates two hypotheses: 
1. If the joint leadership of the Sinhalese and the Tamil reflect 
accommodation, tolerance, and compromise, then meaningful 
reconciliation may follow in Sri Lanka. 
2. By establishing an internationally engineered Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission to examine the alleged human rights violations at the last 
stage of the conflict,55 Sri Lanka may complicate the reconciliation 
process and may even further polarize the Sinhalese and Tamils. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis uses secondary data that are available in the form of Sri Lankan and 
foreign newspaper and journal articles, as well as statements of the state leaders and 
eminent personnel who are involved in the peacebuilding process in Sri Lanka. This 
project examines and analyzes the subject matter through a broad mix of academic 
articles as well as multiple sources from the host nation. The latter include the Sri Lankan 
government appointed “Lesson Learned and Reconciliation Commission’s (LLRC) 
report,”56 government press releases, All Party Conference (APC) reports, and 
constitutional amendments that are related to national harmony and the security of Sri 
Lanka. These sources offer not only an insight into the conflict as a whole but also a way 
to evaluate the conduciveness for a long-lasting reconciliation process in Sri Lanka.  
Additionally, primary sources were gathered through the government publications 
and Hansard reports of Sri Lanka’s parliament. In addition, further secondary sources to 
                                                 
55 “Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka,” United 
Nations, March 31, 2011, 2, http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Sri_Lanka/POE_Report_Full.pdf. 
56 “Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission Report,” Ministry of Defense of Sri Lanka, 
accessed May 10, 2016, http://www.defence.lk/warcrimes/
lessons_learnt_and_reconciliation_commission_final_report.html.  
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the study obtained through the reports of non-governmental organizations that are 
directly dealing with the post-conflict reconstruction process, such as the International 
Crisis Group, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Amnesty International, 
and United Nations Human Rights Commission.  
The method of analysis in this thesis incorporates a case study of South African 
TRC. Further, this effort analyzes the statements of the stakeholders in the conflict 
through discourse analysis because it provides the best way of analyzing different 
statements of respective personalities. Because a number of individual actions also play a 
vital role during the reconciliation process, this thesis uses the method of process tracing 
to analyze these actions and assist in validating the hypotheses of this thesis. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The first chapter of this thesis will primarily discuss the different aspects of the 
reconciliation process through a literature review and theoretical framework of the 
subject. Chapter II will exclusively discuss the background of the conflict between the 
Sinhala and the Tamils, which highlights the core issues that are vital during the 
reconciliation process. This chapter will further focus on the key players to the conflict 
and their impact on the reconciliation process. The next chapter will evaluate the ongoing 
efforts for a reconciliation process by the government and other interest parties. 
Furthermore, this chapter will study the reaction of the Tamils, Sinhalese, international 
community, and different institutions and organizations to the ongoing process in the 
country. In Chapter IV, this thesis will evaluate the South African reconciliation process 
as a case study in order to find its applicability to Sri Lankan context. Finally, in the 
conclusion I describe how the present social, political, and economic condition in the 
country could result in a long-lasting reconciliation process in order to achieve permeant 
peace in Sri Lanka. Additionally, this study will provide recommendations for a viable 
reconciliation framework, while scholars will have a complementary means of 
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II. CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 
The possible causes of the Sri Lankan conflict cover a range of socio-political 
issues occurring since the Sinhalese and the native Tamils both settled on the island in the 
4th century BCE. To be sure, early conflicts were fought between the Sinhalese and the 
Choler, Kerala, and Pandyan invaders (predominantly Tamils) from the Indian sub-
continent in the 6th to 10th centuries BCE, but the fault lines between the two 
communities in the modern Sri Lankan conflict appeared during the British colonial 
period from 1815 to 1948 as an outgrowth of British ethnic politics. 
Although the Sri Lankan conflict originally emerged amid ethnic minority 
grievances, the conflict has moved “beyond a majority-minority dispute.”57 As a result, 
some scholars define the Sinhala-Tamil conflict as a “state formation conflict,”58 which 
involves two communities pursuing two (divergent) state-building projects. The 
evaluation report of the Norwegian peace effort agrees and identifies the Sri Lankan 
conflict as  
being rooted in processes of incomplete state formation, which led to 
competing ethno-nationalist projects. Conflicts over territory are 
particularly resistant to negotiated settlements. Several features of Sri 
Lankan politics made the challenge even harder, including dynastic and 
inter-party rivalries, patronage politics and nationalist mobilization which 
resisted state reform and foreign interference.59  
In this context, any meaningful solutions to the Sri Lankan conflict could mean a 
compromise between the competing nationalist aspirations of the Sinhalese and the 
Tamils.  
Most scholars argue that the existence of the “nationalism of the majority and the 
countervailing nationalism of the minority” during the post-colonial period is one of the 
                                                 
57 Jonathan Goodhand, Jonathan Spencer, and Benedict Korf, ed. Conflict and Peacebuilding in Sri 
Lanka: Caught in the Peace Trap? (New York: Routledge, 2011), 17. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Gunnar Sørbø et al., Pawns of Peace—Evaluation of Norwegian Peace Efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997–
2009 (Oslo, Norway: Norad, 2011), xvi. 
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factors that antagonized the Sinhala and the Tamil communities. Paradoxically, 
throughout the conflict either “Sinhala or Tamil chauvinism or the ultra-nationalism” of 
both communities fueled the escalation of the violence in the country.60 Basically, Sri 
Lankan politicians in both communities were “increasingly tempted to manipulate the 
ethnic issue,” even at the risk of endangering political stability, national unity, and 
integration in the country, as long as it contributed to the political advantage of their party 
or faction.61 Consequently, both communities became polarized and nurtured their 
mutual distrust, culminating ultimately in the decades-long armed struggle, to which both 
sides still attribute different causes. 
This chapter argues that socio-political miscalculations in the post-independence 
period, fueled by the systematic manipulation of communal differences and tensions by 
British colonial rule, generated the Tamil and Sinhalese ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. 
Against this backdrop, Chapter II examines the root causes of the Sri Lankan conflict by 
studying the socio-political aspects from pre-independence and post-independence. 
A. ETHNIC COMPOSITION 
The current demography of Sri Lanka is key to any understanding of the ethnic 
tensions. Ashoka Bandarage, a professor at Georgetown University, explains, 
“Assimilation of the many pre-historic tribal and linguistic groups with colonists mostly 
from South as well as North India produced the island’s [Sri Lanka’s] present day 
population.” Out of the total population, the majority (74.9 percent)62 are the Sinhalese, 
who are predominantly Buddhists and speak Sinhala; a Buddhist inherited an Indo-Aryan 
language known as Pali. The largest minority group is the Sri Lankan Tamils (11.2 
percent), who speak Tamil, the language that is widely spoken in the Southern Indian 
                                                 
60 Dayan Jayatilleka, Long War, Cold Peace, Conflict and Crisis in Sri Lanka (Colombo, Sri Lanka: 
Vijitha Yapa, 2013), 5. 
61 Ibid., 6–8. 
62 “National Census Report 2012,” National Census Department of Sri Lanka, 127, accessed, 
September 28, 2016, http://www.statistics.gov.lk/PopHouSat/CPH2011/Pages/Activities/Reports/
FinalReport/FinalReport.pdf. 
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state of Tamil Nadu.63 In addition, there are Up-country Tamils (4.1 percent), “who are 
South Indian laborers brought by the British from 1825 onwards to work on coffee, and 
later, tea plantations in the island.”64 Moors or Muslims are the next minority group (9.3 
percent), who also speak Tamil as a main language. 
Unlike the Tamils who have a broad base of settlement in India, the Sinhala 
ethnolinguistic group that evolved in Sri Lanka has no settlement lineage in any other 
country in the world. According to the current disposition, Sri Lankan Tamils largely 
settled in the northern and eastern part of the country, although they maintain a 
significant number of population throughout the island. Statistics reveal that in 2012, 27 
percent of Tamils lived outside the north and the east, while only 2.6 percent of the 
Sinhalese lived among the Tamils in the same provinces. The ethnically diverse eastern 
province has its unique distribution of three communities in sizable numbers: Sri Lankan 
Tamils (39.29 percent), Muslims (36.69 percent), and Sinhalese (23.15 percent).65 Up-
country Tamils are living in parts of the central highlands of the island. Sinhalese live in 
all parts of the country, but few reside in the Northern Province. The majorities of 
Muslims live in the Eastern Province, but generally maintains their presence around the 
country. Amid these religious differences, the Sinhalese, Tamils, and Muslims worship 
the Sri Pada (Adam’s peak) and Katharagama temple in equal faiths. 
B. COLONIAL RULE AND ITS EFFECT ON POST-INDEPENDENCE SRI 
LANKA 
The origin of the Sinhalese and the Tamil conflict dates back to the British 
colonial period from 1815 to 1948.66 The British colonizers successfully disrupted the 
                                                 
63 Ashoka Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka: Terrorism, Ethnicity, Political Economy 
(Bloomington, IN: iUniverse, 2009), 30–31. 
64 Ibid. 
65 National Census Department, 132. 
66 “Sri Lanka experienced two successive periods of European colonial rule prior to British: 
Portuguese between 1505 and 1658; Dutch between 1658 and 1796. Under both the Portuguese and Dutch, 
the degree of effective control over parts of the country was limited. Sinhalese maintained their 
independent over highland Kingdom of Kandy while the Tamils were confined to Jaffna in the north of the 
island.” Abdul Hasnat, Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: A Post War Review (Saarbrucken, Germany: LAP 
LAMBERT, 2012), 14. 
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long-standing unity between the indigenous Tamils and the Sinhalese by promoting 
“inherent separation” between these groups in order to exercise the “divide and rule” 
imperial strategy.67 The British created new territories on the island without giving much 
attention to the demography.68 Consequently, the British divided the country into five 
administrative provinces: North, South, East, West, and Central. In so doing, they 
abolished and disintegrated the Sinhalese-ruled Kandyan kingdom and some segments 
attached to the artificially created new provinces. As a result, both communities became 
concentrated in different parts of the island and were compelled to leave inherited lands 
for these new settlements. 
Additionally, the British government granted better education facilities, greater 
political inclusion, and better employment opportunities to Tamils over the majority 
Sinhalese during the latter part of the 19th century, and this disparity created a backlash 
among the Sinhala Buddhists.69 As a result, Buddhist nationalists mobilized the Sinhala 
masses under the Sinhala Mahajana Sabai (People’s Committee), whereas the Tamil 
nationalists in 1921 established a separate Tamil Mahajana Sabai that ultimately served 
to deepen the ethnic rivalry between both communities. 
In 1919, the British allowed the formation of the Ceylon National Congress 
(CNC) in order to ease the communal tensions in the country. The main objective of the 
organization was “to agitate for constitutional reforms while working on ‘the twin 
principles’ of communal harmony and national unity.”70 A Tamil, Sir Ponnambalam 
Arunachalam, was the CNC’s first president, and his leadership was widely 
                                                 
67 Iromi Dharmawardane, “Sri Lanka’s Post-Conflict Strategy: restorative Justice for Rebels and 
Rebuilding of Conflict-affected Communities,” Terrorism Research Initiative, 7, no. 6 (2013), 4, 
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68 Bandarage The Separatist Conflict ,18. 
69 Dharmawardana, “Sri Lankan Post-Conflict Strategy,” 3. “In 1925 Sinhalese constituted 42.5 
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acknowledged by both the Sinhalese and Muslim elites. Unfortunately, the CNC split 
over the question of the allocation of seats in the legislative council, due to the 
introduction of territorial-based representation by the British, which Tamils claimed 
favored the Sinhala majority. This shift marked the beginning of the “ethnic problem” in 
the country.71  
The introduction of the parliamentary democracy in the country significantly 
altered the power structure between two communities; the Buddhist majority, who had 
been marginalized over 400 years of colonial rule, won the majority of seats in the 1931 
elections.72 Amid new political reforms, Tamil political leaders insisted on a parity of 
representation among the Sinhalese by claiming 50–50 proportionality at the Soulbury 
commission in 1944, which was later rejected as preposterous. Paradoxically, by the end 
of the British colonial legacy, the Sri Lankan community was deeply divided along ethnic 
lines, and mistrust and insecurity gripped the Sinhalese and the Tamils; yet both groups 
embraced independence on February 4, 1948. 
C. FROM FEDERALISM TO SEPARATISM: EVOLUTION OF TAMIL 
SEPARATISM AFTER INDEPENDENCE 
After independence in 1948, Sri Lanka demonstrated promising signs for a 
democratic nation—perhaps even a “model of a democracy.”73 The early introduction of 
the universal franchise (a first in Asia), free press, a “rainbow” coalition government 
(Ceylon National Congress [CNC]),74 and a strong social service system are a few of the 
many positive democratic indicators in the post-independence nation. Unfortunately, in 
Sri Lanka (then still called Ceylon), this great promise did not result in an overarching 
unity among the Sinhalese and the Tamils in the new democracy. The 1948 government 
under D.S. Senanayaka failed to incorporate the “minority protection rights” in the 
independence charter, and disenfranchised the Indian Tamils from being Sri Lankan 
                                                 
71 Bandarage The Separatist Conflict. 
72 “1931 council elected 38 Sinhalese, 5 Tamils, 2 Europeans and 1 Muslim, by religion 27 Buddhists, 
15 Christians, 3 Hindus and 1 Muslim,” Ibid., 34. 
73 Jayathilaka, Long War Cold Peace, 24. 
74 “CNC was formed in 1919 uniting all communities on a common national platform,” Ibid., 24. 
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citizens. Both these actions intensified the Tamils’ struggle against Sinhala domination. 
A year after independence, S.J.V. Chelvanayagam, a Tamil nationalist leader, formed a 
Sri Lanka Tamil State party (Illankai Thamil Arasu Kadchi [ITAK]) on a separatist note: 
a regional autonomy for the Tamils was the first shot to fire on Tamil separatism in Sri 
Lanka. 
Chelvanayagam’s Federal Party, or ITAK, promoted the Tamils’ separatist cause. 
Bandarage quotes Chelvanayagam as stating: “Tamils would never be safe from the 
threat of domination and assimilation by the Sinhalese majority while the two 
communities existed together in a unitary state subject to control by the majority”; thus, 
he proposed separation to safeguard the Tamil’s culture and nationality.75 Wilson 
Jeyarathnem, a Tamil scholar, acknowledges Chelvanayagam’s sentiment in his famous 
book Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism, where he argues “whether a single state can 
accommodate two mutually hostile nationalism.” His answer is “No,” much like that of 
the Tamil political leadership.76  
In addition to the Tamils’ argument on minority status against the Sinhalese 
domination, “many Sinhalese see themselves as a besieged regional minority” in the 
shadow of the 70 million Tamils in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu.77 Thus, the 
“double-minority status” increased the insecurity status between both communities, 
which later compelled Tamil political parties to seek partnerships within and beyond the 
nation. ITAK’s agenda was not confined to Tamils; its original version of a “Tamil state” 
morphed into the “Tamil-speaking state” in the 1951 resolution in order to incorporate 
Muslims in the separatist struggle—which Muslim leadership had never acknowledged.78  
Similarly, Chelvanayagam built a close relationship with South Indian political 
leadership, agitating for a Tamil independence in India during the same period. 
Meanwhile, the Westminster-model parliamentary system (the plurality system or first-
                                                 
75 Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict, 39. 
76 Jayarathnam A. Wilson, “Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism” (Vancouver, BC:UBC, 2000),116-118. 
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past-the-post voting) in the country facilitated the majority Sinhalese political parties to 
come to power without a minority coalition; thus, ethnic politics emerged at the forefront. 
D. EMERGENCE OF ETHNIC POLITICS 
Once the Tamil and the Sinhalese began to contest each other, both political 
leaderships favored ethnic mobilization to elevate into power. As a result, S.W.R.D. 
Bandaranayake defected from the ruling United National Party (UNP) and formed the Sri 
Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) in 1951, pledging “to change the colonial social order and 
bring social justice, dignity, and self-respect for the Sinhala Buddhist masses.”79 With his 
extravagant nationalist agenda and the overwhelming support of Buddhist monks, 
indigenous Ayurveda doctors, Sinhala teachers, peasants, and workers, Bandaranayke 
won the 1956 elections, which Bandarage views as “the rising tide of Sinhala Buddhist 
nationalism” in the country.80 By this point, the main ethnic division in politics was quite 
visible, and the overarching national identity provided by the CNC split into two 
trajectories with two separate—and divergent—ideologies, which opened a Pandora’s 
box of politics in the country for years to come. 
E. LANGUAGE CRISIS: EFFECTS OF THE LANGUAGE REFORMS  
Honoring his election manifesto, Prime Minister Bandaranayake introduced the 
“Sinhala only act (Official Language Act, No. 33 of 1956),”81 declaring “Sinhala as the 
official language with provisions for the reasonable use of the Tamil language in public 
administration, education and the courts.”82 Tamil political leaders vigorously fought 
against this move and viewed it as systematic “discrimination” and “subordination” of the 
Tamil people.83 The measure further fueled separatist sentiments. Many Tamil leaders 
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argued that, “it is better to have our own territory, our own culture and self-respect than 
be a minority on the island living on the good fortune of [the] majority community.”84 In 
contrast, the ruling government argued the linguistic resolution as a “means to improve 
Sinhala competition and to lessen Tamil (as well as Burgher85) entrenchment in the 
public sector.”86  
As a result of the growing tensions between the communities, which the language 
issue exacerbated, in 1958 the second biggest communal violence since independence 
broke out due to another short-sighted language-based policy (Sri Policy) brought out by 
the ruling government and misinterpreted by Tamil politicians. During this event, state-
owned buses running to Jaffna bore the Sinhalese letter “Sri” on their number plates, 
which Tamils perceived as another act of Sinhala hegemony.87 Later, the government 
rejected the Tamils’ allegation and explained the identical meaning of the word “Sri” in 
both languages. Although the successive governments brought more conciliatory 
proposals (for example, the Tamil Language [special provision] Act No. 28 of 1958 and 
the Tamil language [special provision] regulations in 1966)88 to rectify the linguistic 
disparity among the groups, the language crisis became embedded in the political 
grievances of the Tamil politicians. 
F. WHO OWNS THE TERRITORY: THE ISSUE OF LAND?  
Along with nationalist sentiments and to solve the acute land issues89 among the 
Sinhalese, Senanayaka’s government initiated an ambitious re-settlement plan of Sinhala 
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peasants in the north central and eastern provinces (the Dry Zone region) of the country. 
Government actions had a ripple effect among the Tamil political leadership, who 
deemed the move a “transfer of political control of the Tamil districts to the Sinhalese,”90 
predicting an imminent alteration to the Tamil vote base in these regions, as well as a 
possible Sinhala encroachment on Tamil “home lands.” Against this argument, many 
historians such as C. W. Nicholas view this state-enforced re-settlement process as a 
“settlement at ancient Sinhala territorial division known as Digawapi-Mandala or 
Digawapi-Rata.”91 Either way, the government initiated re-settlement project altered the 
demography of the eastern province.92 Between 1946 and 1971, the Sinhala population 
increased from 5.9 percent to 17.7 percent and the Tamil population declined from 50.3 
percent to 46.4 percent in the eastern province. The Muslim population declined from 
42.2 percent to 35.1 percent.93  
In an attempt to resolve the Tamil upheaval over the government colonization 
plans, the successive governments of Bandaranayake (SLFP) and Dudly Senanayake 
(UNP) negotiated two pacts with ITAK leader Chelvanayagam, commonly known as 
Badaranayake–Chelvanayagam and Senanayake–Chelvanayagam pacts. The former 
agreed to select “allottees [sic] and employees in land settlement” while giving 
preference to the Tamils; the latter agreed to consider landless Tamils and Tamil-
speaking people for the settlements on priority basis.94 However, both pacts faced 
opposition from the Sinhalese and Muslims due to the alleged concession to the “Tamil 
homeland” demand, so both pacts were abrogated before they were enacted. 
G. EDUCATIONAL REFORMS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Having failed to find a reasonable solution to the land issue, Sri Lankan 
politicians tried to solve the education disparity between the two groups—and the 
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situation went from bad to worse. In light of well-funded American missionary activities 
and greater allocation of the colonial state’s grant-in-aid benefits, the Tamils in the 
Northern Province had comparatively better facilities than the Sinhalese students for 
English language and pre-university education.95 Bandarage states, “Given their superior 
access to English, Tamils were able to claim a disproportionate number of places in those 
faculties, nearly 50 percent in medicine and Engineering in 1969–1970.”96 In contrast, 
Tamil scholars argue that due to ecological constraints, Tamil students were relying on 
education, not agriculture, for their livelihood, under the motto, “education [is] land.”97 
Certainly, the colonial-period conventions of the education system favored a higher 
proportion of Tamils to enter universities in science and math faculties. 
Amid the emerging pressure against Tamil favoritism, the socialist government 
introduced language-based affirmative action, known as “standardization,” which 
promised to admit “a politically acceptable ratio of Tamil to Sinhalese students in the 
engineering, medicine, and other science faculties of the University of Ceylon (now Sri 
Lanka) in 1970.98 The new policy abolished the merit system and introduced a 
proportionate system based on the language. As a result, Tamil students had to score 
more marks in similar subjects than their Sinhalese counterparts during university 
entrance exams.99 Thus, Tamil nationalists argued “for the first time, the integrity of 
university admissions policy was tampered with by using ethnicity as a basis.”100  
With the introduction of the district quota system in 1972,101 for the benefit of the 
underprivileged students within each language, Tamil political leaders intensified their 
campaign against marginalization and placed “separatism” at the forefront of their 
political agendas. Further, this perceived discrimination was a major factor for Tamil 
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youths to become alienated and radicalized against the Sinhala people.102 However, in 
the process, the district quota system opened more opportunities for the students of low 
caste/class and the Muslim students of the backward regions to get into the university 
(low-caste Tamils and lower-class Sinhalese students’ university admission increased by 
39 percent).103  
H. FORTUNES AND MISFORTUNES IN STATE EMPLOYMENT FOR 
TAMILS 
The government’s effort to create parity in education affected Tamil employment 
at the public sector. The decreased access to the university in the 1970s was 
“compounded by Tamils’ loss of privileged access to state employment since the 
introduction of the Sinhala language policy in 1956.”104 In contrast, Sinhalese political 
leaders argue that these educational reforms were necessary to rectify the imbalance in 
ethnic representation at the public sector. Besides, Manogaran explains that the high 
unemployment in the 1970s was not limited to Tamil youths, but included the 96.3 
percent of youth in both communities.105 As a result, educated youths had no meaningful 
employment. The result was the first radical Sinhala youth uprising: Janatha Wimukthi 
Peramuna- JVP (people’s liberation front) against the government in 1971. The 
government brutally suppressed the movement, but the Sinhala uprising gave much 
needed impetus to the Tamil youth militant organization in the years to come.106  
In order to eliminate the growing unemployment among the Tamils, the 
government established new industries in predominantly Tamil areas. The cement factory 
at Kankasanthurai, the paper mill factory at Valachchanai, the salt factory at Elephant 
pass, the mineral factory at Pulmodai, the flour factory at Trincomalee, and the chemical 
factory at Paranthan provided employment for the Tamil youths in those areas (LTTE 
destroyed all these factories except the flour factory at Trincomalee). However, a severe 
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economic crisis and a shortage of basic consumer goods frustrated the rural Sinhala youth 
of the south and the Tamil youth in the North, who advocated for greater political 
inclusion, education, and employment. 
I. NON-VIOLENCE TO VIOLENCE: EMERGENCE OF THE ARMED 
CONFLICT 
The Tamil youth’s growing frustration was visible through their sporadic violent 
acts during this period; thus, these armed groups merged with Tamil nationalist political 
factions to pursue a two-pronged strategy: non-violence and violence; ultimately, the 
violent secessionist struggle was born. Due to the continuous failure to gain any 
substantial results on the political front, the non-violent approach to separatism by the 
Tamil politicians lost its popularity among the Tamil community.107 Additionally, 
repeated failures of the ITAK in the general elections of this period created a power 
vacuum in the legislature to pursue the Tamil separatist cause among the Sinhala polity; 
thus, “Tamil civilian political parties became irrelevant, giving way to the militants.”108 
The birth of the Tamil militancy had a profound effect on the series of socioeconomic 
and political reforms of the successive governments of this period. 
1. 1972 Constitution 
The 1972 constitution further intensified the Tamil separatist demand because of 
premier status given to the Buddhists. The constitution ensured the fundamental rights of 
all citizens before the law, yet preserved the minority-rights clause of the Soulbury 
constitution.109 Tamil politicians viewed the new constitution as a “deliberate attempt to 
reduce Tamil culture and language to subordinate status.”110 Tamil political leaders 
boycotted the new constitution, but it was adopted on May 1972.111  
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Meanwhile, due to the perception of increasing marginalization under the Sinhala 
leadership, Tamil political parties formed the Tamil Union Front (TUF, later designated 
as Tamil Union Liberation Front [TULF]) by amalgamating three leading Tamil political 
outfits: ITAK, the Tamil Congress, and the Ceylon Worker’s congress of Indian Tamil 
plantations. Subsequently, the TUF provided covert support to the rising Tamil militant 
youths to instigate violence in the northern city of Jaffna. The origin of the contemporary 
armed struggle is attributed to student activism, specifically the Tamil Students League 
(TSL), which began in 1970. It later became the Tamil New Tigers (TNT) and 
subsequently the military wing of the organization became the LTTE in May of 1976, 
under the leadership of Velupillai Prabhakaran. Apart from the political deprivation, the 
“rigid caste system and Vellala [Tamil elites] domination of the Tamil community”112 
was another reason for the rise of youth violence in the north. This hatred of the LTTE 
against the Tamil elites was further evident by counting the number of Vellala Tamils 
killed by the LTTE throughout the active phase of the conflict. As Bandarage explains, 
“As economic crisis worsen, ethnic cleavages sharpen, escalating into civil wars and 
separatist struggles.” These armed gangs assassinated a number of Tamil political leaders 
and civil servants and attacked government institutions, actions that the TUF propagated 
as “holy war (Punitha Yutham)” against the Sinhala state.113  
Political violence reached its climax after the 1977 parliamentary elections when 
the Tamil militant groups carried out a number of subversive activities against the 
government—and the state responded with equal force.114 Post-election violence spread 
throughout the country, resulting in a number of killings, displacements, and deepening 
the polarization of the Sinhalese and the Tamils, thereby compelling the newly elected 
government to find ways to mitigate the conflict.115  
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2. 1978 Constitution 
The UNP government introduced the 1978 constitution with a number of 
concessions to the minority in the country. Tamil became a national language. With the 
introduction of a proportionate voting system, the constitution replaced majoritarianism 
and allowed greater political participation for minority political parties. Additionally, 
while making Buddhism the foremost religion, the constitution granted freedom of 
religion and the choice of religion for other minority groups in the country. The most 
significant factor of the new system was that the two main political parties, SLFP and 
UNP, had to rely on minority parties to form a government and establish the majority at 
the parliament.116  
Additionally, the new constitution removed language-based ethnic quotas or 
media (science, engineering, etc.) Standardization in the university entrance system 
provided more opportunity for rural Tamil and Sinhala students to enter higher education 
in the country. Many argue that the Tamils’ entrance to state universities has dropped 
since 1978, but annual statistics reveal that they maintained a higher percentage of 
university admissions in proportion to the Island’s Tamil population.117 “In the 
engineering and the medicine faculties they [Tamils] held at least 35 percent of the 
positions more than a decade following 1978, and around 25 percent for all the science 
faculties.”118  
By and large, the Tamils’ major grievances of language parity, fundamental 
rights, educational rights, and political opportunity had been acknowledged and 
addressed in the 1978 constitution, yet neither TUF nor the Tamil militants embraced this 
opportunity for a meaningful reconciliation among the Sinhalese and the Tamils.  
3. Economic Liberalization 
The sudden shift of the existing state-centered welfare economy to market-
oriented liberal economic policies had some profound effects for the Sinhala and Tamil 
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crisis. Along with economic liberalization, Sri Lanka opened the floodgates for 
international aid and donor projects. One such program was the Accelerated Mahaweli 
Development Program (AMDP), a $1.5 billion World Bank-funded event primarily 
designed to build 15 hydroelectricity plants and cultivate 360,000 hectares of barren 
lands in the Dry Zone by re-settling 750,000 landless, which commenced its work in 
1978. However, many scholars identify the AMDP as a “source of contention among the 
ethnic communities of the country over land and population distribution. The majority of 
the intended settlements became Sinhalese dominated, furthering the Tamil’s claim on 
“Sinhalazation in traditional Tamil’s homeland.”119 Scholars argue that the new 
economic reforms not only “produced new inequalities, pauperized the lower-middle 
class and led to ethnic scapegoating,” but also “expanded the opportunities for ethnically 
based rent seeking and cronyism.”120 In general, economic liberalization produced more 
grievances between the two communities than opportunities. 
J. EMERGENCE OF THE CIVIL WAR 
The abolition of the Westminster-based parliamentary system and the introduction 
of the executive presidency led the state into more authoritarianism and a high state of 
patrimonialism, which further inflamed the Sinhalese–Tamil conflict and the separatist 
violence turned into a civil war.121 In the aftermath of the LTTE killing 13 government 
soldiers on July 24, 1983, the Sri Lankan South went on a rampage against Tamils and 
created a black mark in the history of the conflict. Black July is considered one of the 
most significant events in the Sri Lankan conflict, as the ethnic conflict spiraled into a 
civil war. Statistics reveal that, “estimates of Tamils killed during the Black July is about 
200, some 100,000 were forced to enter refugee camps, and about 30,000 Tamils lost 
their means of income, as a revenge LTTE killed more than 100,000 Sinhalese since 1983 
in the month of July.”122 Still, many scholars believe that the “Black July then, was not a 
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sudden and spontaneous riot or outbreak of passion, not an inevitable eruption of 
primordial resentment and hatred between two ethnic groups.”123 It was politically 
instigated action by both the Tamil and Sinhalese political leadership at that time. 
One feature of the aftermath of Black July was the mass-scale migration of the 
Tamil to different parts of the world as refugees and asylum seekers. It is estimated that 
“over 100,000 Tamil refugees [went] to India, and another 200,000-300,000 [migrated] to 
Western countries.”124 Later, these groups formed an effective Tamil diaspora, which 
became one of the active stakeholders in the conflict. Many scholars classify that, “this 
widespread Tamil diaspora began voluntarily, and then under coercion, to fund the 
separatist activities of the LTTE movement. These activities were illegal, conducted 
secretly and were often carried out under the guise of humanitarian aid.”125 By 1998, the 
Tamil diaspora contributed “24–26 million USD to the LTTE, and this figure increased 
yearly. In the latter stages of the conflict, the contribution reached 200–300 million USD 
annually.”126 At the end of the 1983 riots, both communities suffered frequent and severe 
atrocities at the hands of LTTE and Sinhalese thugs.127  
The Tamil Tigers intensified their brutal actions against the moderate Tamil 
politicians in 1978. Prabhakaran considers that “Tamils and Sinhalese were historical 
enemies and a Tamil person had no rights to be on the side of Sinhalese establishment. 
This was not what the majority of the Tamil people thought, but remained Prabhakaran’s 
central theme all through the years he lived.”128 This systematic elimination of 
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competing Tamil militant group leadership (TELO, PLOTE, EROS, and EPRLF) and 
Tamil political heads later turned against the Sinhalese and the Muslims in Tamil-
dominated areas and the periphery. The sharp increase in violence forced the government 
to introduce the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA)129 in 1979, which later became a 
permanent law in 1982. 
By the 1980s, the LTTE’s political violence expanded into terrorist actions; thus, 
the Tamil Tigers carried out a number of “indiscriminate bomb attacks in the Sinhalese-
dominated south, particularly in Colombo (LTTE pioneered suicide bombing as a tactic 
in war).”130 Behind this backdrop, Indian government deployed its peace-enforcing 
troops in Sri Lanka under the Indo-Lanka pact. After suffering a humiliating defeat at the 
hands of the LTTE, Indian forces left the country by giving international recognition to 
the LTTE. In 1990, the country observed some of the worst actions of the LTTE, mainly 
killing and forced expulsion of Muslims and the Sinhalese from the North to create a 
“mono-ethnic land.”131 Many scholars view this action as the TULF’s strategy to pursue 
their prime intention of “a greater independence.”132 The famous Tamil scholar 
Manogaran writes that the “TULF manifesto also stated that Eelam (Tamil Kingdom) 
would be ultimately established either by peaceful means or direct action or struggle.”133 
Against this backdrop, many scholars such as Jayathilaka argue that the Tamils had been 
cleverly used by the LTTE and TULF in their politico-military campaign to win 
separatism.134 During its killing spree in 1990, the LTTE attacked Muslims in the North 
and East by killing more than 1,000 and forcefully evicting some 75,000 from Northern 
districts within a period of 48 hours,135 with most of these victims living in the refugee 
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camps of Puttalam district to date. Muslims in the country perceived this event as “ethnic 
cleansing” by the LTTE.136 These attacks followed the LTTE killing some 600 
surrendered Sinhalese and Muslim policemen in the East in a Nazi-style execution.137  
While building up his forces into a semi-conventional status (as the only terrorist 
organization in the world, the LTTE have maintained a de facto air and a naval force in 
addition to a formidable ground force),138 Prabhakaran intensified terrorist attacks 
throughout Sri Lanka. During the period of 1989–1994, he carried out a “quadruple 
whammy” by assassinating top Tamil moderates (TULF leader) A. Amirthalingam 
(1989); former Indian Prime minister Rajiv Gandhi (1991) and Sri Lankan President 
Ranasinghe Premadasa (1993); and LTTE’s second-in-command, Mahattaya (1994). 
Prabhakaran became the only terrorist leader to murder two heads of state in democratic 
nations (and he narrowly missed Sri Lankan President Chandrika Bandaranayake in 
1999). 
Apart from political assassinations, the LTTE carried out suicide and bomb 
attacks on innocent civilians, forced child recruitment, and traded in extortion, money 
laundering, piracy, human smuggling, arms dealing, and training to foreign terrorist 
groups; thus, it became the world’s most ruthless terrorist outfit.139 The LTTE’s powerful 
international network maintained direct links with leading terrorist organizations, such as 
Hamas and Al-Qaida, while maintaining equal ties with organized crime groups in Asia 
and Europe.140 Jonathan Goodhand summarizes the LTTE as, “a highly centralized and 
militaristic organization, with only a weak political wing and galvanized by a 
nationalistic diaspora, it showed little openness to compromise or internal 
democratization,”141 which further explains the rigid nature of the organization in any 
means of negotiations. 
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Following the September 11, 2001 terror attacks in the United States, Sri Lanka 
joined the bandwagon of the West for the “War on Terror,” and bolstered its anti-terrorist 
strategy. Additionally, military actions against the LTTE were further facilitated when 
the LTTE was designated as a terrorist outfit by many countries around the world, 
including the United States, the U.K., Canada, Australia, the E.U., and India. As a result, 
the Sri Lankan conflict changed its dimensions from an ethnic conflict to a terrorist issue. 
Amid mediation, peace dialogues, periodical cease-fire agreements, and more 
interestingly, even under a cease-fire monitoring mission (Sri Lanka Monitoring 
Mission[SLMM]), the Sri Lankan conflict intensified at unprecedented levels. 
Prabhakaran’s deliberate violation of cease-fire agreements after every peace initiative 
and his dubious commitment to a permanent solution to the conflict irked the mediators 
and the Sri Lankan government. Finally, the government of Sri Lanka sought a military 
solution and executed it by skillfully managing international pressure. Government forces 
militarily defeated the LTTE on May 18, 2009, but Sri Lanka still had not achieved a 
meaningful reconciliation between the Sinhalese and the Tamils. 
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III. DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO RECONCILIATION 
THROUGH THE CONFLICT RESOLUTION: SRI LANKAN 
EXPERIENCE 
Since the beginning of the civil war in 1983, Sri Lanka experienced a number of 
reconciliation efforts through conflict resolution attempts, albeit with no conclusive 
results. Many observers argue that in the Sri Lankan context, conflict resolution was used 
to build reconciliation among the Tamils and the Sinhalese, since “reconciliation is a 
consequence of successful conflict resolution.”142 Most peace activists argue that both 
sides only feigned interest in most of the negotiation process.143 Similarly, the “top-
down” approach of these resolution efforts sought—and thus received—little or no input 
from grassroots-level stakeholders in the conflict.144  
Scholars mainly divide these efforts into four distinct time periods: Eelam wars I 
(1983–1987), II (1990–1994), III (1995–2002), and IV (2006–2009). Throughout this 
timeline, violence took precedence over peace.145 Even when conflict resolution was the 
order of the day, the process was marred by some serious flaws, including, perhaps most 
notably, the absence of a Tamil political party in the composition. In other words, a 
legitimate government and a terrorist group tried to build a peace process that did not 
include the rest of the parties to the multi-polar conflict. Sri Lankan Tamils, mostly 
Muslim, could choose either to let the LTTE represent them or go without representation 
in these processes. The LTTE systematically undertook to become the sole 
representatives of the Tamils, eclipsing any moderate or conciliatory Tamil opinion.146 
Studies reveal a few important reasons for the nonexistence of moderate Tamil political 
representation: the LTTE’s systematic elimination of rival and moderate Tamil groups to 
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maintain its hegemony among Tamils and the government’s ban of TULF from political 
activities in 1983 (through the 6th amendment). These reports go on to explain that the 
vacuum allowed the LTTE to act as the sole representative of Tamil speaking-people.147 
However, Muslims who consider themselves a “distinct religious and an ethnic group” 
never acknowledged the LTTE claim.148  
Similarly, Sinhalese politicians at power carried out government and party 
agendas, while leaving the consent of the nationalist and opposition party’s views 
unaddressed. This non-involvement “generated insecurities amongst the parties who were 
left out, leading to ‘spoiler’ behavior.”149 As a result, every resolution effort failed amid 
competing nationalism, political rivalry among the two main Sinhalese political parties, 
and the authoritarian character of the LTTE. 
In retrospect, these failed conflict resolution attempts “added new layers of 
complexity to the conflict.”150 Among other things, they hastened the involvement of the 
international community and other interest groups in the conflict. This chapter will 
discuss conflict resolution attempts in the active phase of the conflict (1983–2009) and 
the post-conflict period, emphasizing the reasons for the failure of these efforts and the 
ultimate effect on the reconciliation process. Additionally, this chapter explores the 
change of political dynamics in Sri Lanka in 2015 and its effect on the reconciliation 
efforts in the country.  
A. EARLY EFFORTS OF INTERNATIONAL ACTORS AND FAILURES IN 
THE RECONCILIATION PROCESS (1983–2006) 
After failing to achieve a viable homegrown solution to the conflict, Sinhalese 
and Tamil protagonists sought international assistance for a solution. Additionally, the 
growing violence in the country grabbed world attention, which was required for an 
urgent intervention. These early efforts followed the conflict resolution process because 
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stakeholders presumed that “an agreement emerging from a process of conflict resolution 
within an interactive problem-solving framework and the new relationship it promotes 
are conducive to stable peace, mutually enhancing cooperation, and ultimate 
reconciliation”151 in Sri Lanka. One of the main arguments of the international 
community was that, “war was ‘unwinnable,’ and that a political settlement involving 
devolution would lead LTTE to give up terrorism and embrace the path of democracy and 
rule of law.”152 The prognostications about the military solution proved to be quite 
wrong, but nonetheless, the most noteworthy contribution to the reconciliation came 
through internationally mediated dialogues.  
1. Indian Intervention  
Even notwithstanding the Tamil refugee influx to the country (approximately 
150,000 refugees crossed over to India after the Black July),153 India viewed the Sri 
Lankan conflict from a geo-strategic perspective, given the island’s proximity to the 
Indian sub-continent and its strategic location in the Indian Ocean.154 At the time, India 
guarded its nonaligned status but also inclined somewhat toward the Soviet Union. 
Therefore, some scholars argue that “Sri Lanka’s new (in late 1970s) pro-west foreign 
policy stand raised security concerns and created an irritant for Indian policy makers, 
while the representative measures of the government against Tamil ethno-political 
struggle offered Indian legitimate entry point into Sri Lankan affairs.”155  
For the Sri Lankan polity, the Indian intervention to the conflict was more a 
“design approach” that was influenced by the Tamil Nadu politics, mainly to obtain 
comprehensive political powers to the Tamils in Sri Lanka.156 There are more than sixty 
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million Tamils living in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu who share “a common 
culture, linguistic and religious ties” with the Tamils in Sri Lanka; the two groups 
perceive themselves as an integral part of the larger Tamil community.157 Together, Sri 
Lankan Tamils perceived India as the dominant party at the mediation due to its ethnic 
lineage and regional dominance. Therefore, the Indian government “cautioned all foreign 
powers to ‘keep out of the current turmoil in Sri Lanka.’”158  
On the flip side, Indian involvement in the Sri Lankan conflict was largely due to 
the desire to safeguard the territorial integrity against “potentially expensive, regionally 
based Tamil secessionist state [Tamil Nadu] basically to avoid a re-emergence of Tamil 
secessionist aspirations in the South Indian state.”159 As far as policy was concerned, the 
Indian government supported power sharing between the Sinhalese and the Tamils within 
a unitary state.160 Thus, the Indian central government initiated a number of conflict-
resolution attempts with the GOSL, TULF, and LTTE until the signing of the Indo-Lanka 
Treaty on July 1987. This accord was mainly designed to establish peace and stability by 
deploying an Indian peacekeeping force in the country. 
a. Annexure C 
The first initiative of the Indian government came in December 1983 in the form 
of an outline for regional devolution of power between the Tamils and the Sinhalese—
commonly known as “Annexure C.” These proposals called for greater autonomy for the 
Tamils through the merger of the Northern and Eastern provinces based on ethnic 
proportionality, thereby accepting the Tamil’s “homeland” demands.161 The same 
proposals were discussed at the all-party conference in 1984. The Sri Lankan government 
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opposed a merger of the North and East, while TULF supported the Indian plan. As a 
result, proposals failed.  
Meanwhile, due to the ongoing diplomatic tussle between Colombo and New 
Delhi over Sri Lanka’s increased military allegiance to the West, Indira Gandhi’s 
government made a policy decision to support the LTTE and armed and trained the group 
using state intelligence teams (Research and Analysis Wing [RAW]).162 Bandarage 
identifies two reasons for Gandhi’s action: regional security due to Pakistan’s growing 
relationship with Colombo and Tamil Nadu political pressure.163 Overall, the Indian 
effort failed to realize any gains in reconciliation. Rather, it came to be perceived as a 
political bargain between the government and Tamil representatives.  
b. Thimphu Talks 
The second Indian reconciliation effort was made by Premier Rajiv Gandhi in 
June 1985. After a three-month ceasefire between the LTTE and GOSL, both parties, 
along with other militant groups (PLOTE, TELO, EPRLF, AND, EROS, and moderate 
TULF), met at the capital of Bhutan, Thimphu.  
In light of Premier Gandhi’s position on a unitary Sri Lankan state,164 during the 
meeting the Tamil representative demanded four non-negotiable principles (Thimphu 
Principles) from the Sri Lankan government: “1) recognition of the Tamils of Sri Lanka 
as distinct ‘Nation’; 2) recognition of an identified Tamil ‘homeland’ and guarantee of its 
territorial integrity; 3) recognition of the inalienable right of self-determination of the 
Tamil nation; 4) recognition of the right of full citizenship and fundamental rights of all 
Tamils who look upon Sri Lanka as their country.”165 For its part, the Sri Lankan 
government refused to accept the first three demands, which struck the GOSL as 
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tantamount to a “surrender by the government at the negotiating table everything they 
[Tamil secessionists] hoped to achieve by their Civil war.”166  
The second round of Thimpu talks abruptly came to a halt due to the sudden exit 
of the Tamil representatives who accused the GOSL of violating the ceasefire, which 
later proved to be a hoax to cover the LTTE’s battle preparations during this period.167 
After failing to achieve a political compromise between rival parties, the Indian effort at 
Thimpu made no real progress toward resolution.  
c. 19 December Proposals 
Despite the failed Thimphu talks and the escalation of violence in Sri Lanka 
thereafter, the Indian government continued outside the framework of Thimpu principles. 
Finally, in December 1986, India proposed a federal system, slicing the Sinhala-majority 
district of Ampara from the East and merging a balance with the North. A referendum 
would precede the redrawing of provincial lines.168 Due to the worsening of the conflict 
in the aftermath of the failure of Thimpu dialogue, the New Delhi government came 
under heavy criticism from its Tamil Nadu political ally, and India in turn redirected its 
pressure to Colombo. Amid India’s mounting pressure to accept the so-called 19 
December proposals, and under a heavy opposition from the Sinhala nationalist 
movements, the GOSL suffered a number of LTTE attacks in Colombo and the suburbs. 
Additionally, the LTTE waged war against other Tamil militant groups to become a 
hegemonic power in the Tamil community.  
As a consequence, the government set nine conditions for any agreement to end 
the conflict: “abandonment of the demand for a separate state; cessation of hostilities; 
closing down of insurgent training camps; surrender of arms by the Tamil militants; 
lifting of the emergency in the predominantly Tamil areas; and general amnesty to 
militants.”169 Due to fear of the LTTE’s reprisals, the Tamil leadership rejected these 
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proposals.170 Failing to secure a fair political consensus with the LTTE, the GOSL 
launched its military operations to find a favorable solution to the conflict, amid 
mounting Indian pressure to cease military actions. 
d. Indo-Lanka Accord  
After forcing the Sri Lankan government to cease its ongoing military success 
against the LTTE (Operation Balawegaya),171 in 1987 India signed the Indo-Lanka pact, 
claiming that the agreement “advanced the cause of ethnic harmony.”172 According to the 
objectives of this pact, the Tamil’s ‘homeland’ concept would be acknowledged outright, 
and the temporary merger of the North and East provinces would proceed without a prior 
referendum. A majority of the Sinhalese opposed these proposals, claiming first and 
foremost that they were a violation of the Island’s sovereignty. Further, Muslims and 
Tamils in the East worried about their existence in the agreement in terms of regional 
differences in the North and East. Therefore, Bandarage states: “Failing to recognize 
fundamental differences between the North and the East would doom the accord to 
failure from the beginning.”173  
Paradoxically, the Indo-Lanka accord had no concession for reconciliation. 
Scholars perceived the accord as largely unpopular and “controversial” due to “the loss of 
Sri Lanka’s sovereignty and acceptance of the ‘Tamil homeland’ thesis.”174 However, the 
accord produced the 13th amendment (recognition of Tamil as an official language) and 
the 16th amendment (establishment of provincial councils) to the Sri Lankan constitution, 
                                                 
170 Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict, 128. 
171 Operation Balawegaya is one of the most successful military operations conducted by Sri Lanka 
military in 1987 and the last phase of the operation successfully surrounded the main command element of 
LTTE which included Prabhakaran. However, the operation was called off due to the immense pressure 
from the Indian government in May 1987. 
172 Robert, I. Robert ed., Creating Peace in Sri Lanka: Civil War and Reconciliation (Washington, 
DC: Brooking Institution, 1999), 50. 
173 Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict, 137.  
174 Ibid., 134. 
 42
which extended new language rights to the Tamils and strengthened “Tamil political 
autonomy by devolving power to the northern and eastern sections of the country.”175  
Apart from these concessions to the Tamils, the Indian government sought a 
guarantee from the GOSL on four important security related aspects: 
1. Seek Indian advice prior to employment of foreign military and 
intelligence personnel. 
2. Prevent using any foreign broadcasting cooperation for military or 
intelligence purposes. 
3. Ensure that Trincomalee harbor is not used by any country for military 
purposes. 
4. Operation of the “Trincomalee oil tank farm to be undertaken as a joint 
venture between India and Sri Lanka.”176  
Many Sinhalese viewed these proposals as surrendering “Sri Lanka’s right to 
make independence decision over strategic sphere.”177 Additionally, scholars remark 
that, “Indo-Sri Lanka accord brought Sri Lanka into the Indian security fold for the first 
time in her modern history.”178  
This agitation among the Sinhalese sparked violence, with the emergence of a 
second JVP (a Sinhala radical group)179 insurrection that took arms against the 
government. As a result, the Indian government sent the 100,000-man Indian Peace 
Keeping Force (IPKF) in 1989 to disarm and control the LTTE in the North and East (as 
per the Indo-Lanka accord) and left the GOSL to fight JVP insurgency.180 The 
subsequent events turned into a bloody conflict among IPKF-LTTE and GOSL-JVP: 
“Apart from thousands of civilian deaths, an estimated 1,555 IPKF soldiers died in Sri 
Lanka and [IPKF] had killed 2,592 LTTE; while there were approximately 60,000 deaths 
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that took place in GOSL-JVP conflict.”181 India’s humiliation in the hands of the LTTE 
drew more national and international Tamil support to the organization. 
In the aftermath of these events, the newly elected Sri Lankan government, in a 
controversial move, commenced negotiations with the LTTE and ceased IPKF 
operations, sending back the Indian troops in March 1990. India claimed this move was 
“a great betrayal” by the Sri Lankan government.182  
Meanwhile, a consensus between the main Sinhala political parties, the UNP and 
the SLFP, emerged with the view that the “conflict could not be resolved solely through 
military means, but also required a political settlement… a substantial devolution of 
power.”183 However, in the following year, the LTTE bombed Indian Premier Rajiv 
Gandhi while he was on election campaign in Tamil Nadu. Two years later, a Tiger 
suicide bomber assassinated Sri Lankan president Ranasinhe Premadasa while he was 
attending the May Day parade in the capital city of Colombo. As a result of Premier 
Rajiv’s assassination, the Indian government proscribed the LTTE as a terrorist 
organization and stepped back from negotiations.  
Many scholars blame India’s dual approach of secretly arming the LTTE on the 
one hand and pressing publically for a political solution on the other as the main reason 
that the Sri Lankan conflict resolution process failed.184 The absence of regional 
leadership in conflict resolution in the Sri Lankan issue opened a clear passage for 
international organizations (NGOs and INGOs) and Western nations to intervene.185 It 
started with the initiatives of the newly formed People’s Alliance (PA) government in 
1994. 
                                                 
181 Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict, 153. 
182 Ibid., 152. 
183 Gunnar et al., Pawns of Peace, 128.  
184 Swamy, Tiger Vanquish, viii. 
185 Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict, 156. 
 44
2. The Devolution Package  
A newly elected government began negotiations with the LTTE by signing the 
“Declaration of Cessation of Hostilities” in 1995. Both parties agreed to establish five 
peace-monitoring committees: two from Norway, two from Canada, and one from the 
Netherlands. Subsequently, the government launched its peace plan of the “devolution 
package.” While retaining the portfolios of defense, national security, foreign affairs, 
immigration, currency, international economic relations, airports, and harbors at the 
Centre, this “package” granted all remaining powers to the eight regions of the 
country.186  
Despite the accolades from the international community, the devolution package 
won neither the Sinhala Buddhists nor LTTE for its implementation. The former charged 
that the package was Christian-centric and “ill-advised,” while the latter considered it a 
threat to the LTTE’s fragile claim to be the sole representative of the Tamils.187 Overall, 
the government’s reconciliation efforts never reached the grassroots level and it even 
marginalized Muslims in the East.188 As a result, Muslims demanded self-determination 
in the predominately Muslim South East of the country.189 Even with international 
support, the devolution package failed to satisfy the LTTE; hence, it resumed violence by 
commencing one of the worst periods of the conflict in April 1995. The LTTE’s attack on 
the most sacred Buddhist shrine of Kandy in 1998 (Dalada Maligawa: Temple that 
possesses Lord Buddha’s tooth relic) outraged the Sinhalese youth to fight against Tamil 
terrorism. As the bloody conflict escalated to unprecedented levels, the Sri Lankan 
government invited Norway as a mediator in 1999. 
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3. Norwegian Desperation: Failure of Reconciliation Attempt through 
Liberal Peace Building in Sri Lanka 
The selection of Norway as a peace broker was acknowledged by both the GOSL 
and LTTE as a bone of contention. This choice was based on two main aspects: Norway 
is a state actor (as per the LTTE’s demand), and it did not have any substantial strategic 
interest in Sri Lanka (as per the agreement between the GOSL and India).190 There have 
been many critiques of the selection because although Norway considers itself to be a 
“global peace power house,” others accused the Oslo government of being the agents of a 
“Washington Consensus,” which promotes a neo-liberal agenda on favorable political 
grounds.191 Bandarage, quoting U.S. anthropologist Francisco Gil White, characterizes 
Norway’s “neo-liberal agenda in delegitimizing, destabilizing, and dismembering 
existing states to maintain the hegemony of the West,” mainly by using its influence on 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.192 Additionally, due to the 
active Tamil diaspora lobby in the country, many Sri Lankans were skeptical about the 
integrity of the Norwegian role as a neutral player.193 Nonetheless, as a measure of 
goodwill, the Norwegian government pledged to triple its financial aid (from 11 million 
USD to 30 million USD)194 to Sri Lanka during this period of time. 
The Norwegian conflict-resolution process kicked off with thumping international 
approval. Many Western nations viewed this effort as a “likely peace building success 
story,”195 and commentators described it as an “internationalized” effort with the heavy 
involvement of such international actors as the United States, the EU, and Japan.196 
However, domestically an “uneasy coexistence” prevailed between Prime Minister Ranil 
Wickramasinghe with his ruling United National Front (UNF—a coalition party) and his 
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rival Chandrika Kumaranathunga of the People’s Alliances (PA) as the president. The 
president and the Premier did not maintain a common agreement on the Norwegian 
effort, since the former had been largely excluded from the process. Disagreement at the 
level of political leadership created widespread criticism of the ceasefire agreement 
(CFA) from the Sinhalese nationalist parties and Muslims.197  
On the flipside, the LTTE controlled a swath of land in the North and the East, 
running a “parallel administrative system” from banks to courts, and tax collection to 
national day celebrations; simply, “the movement came to think and act like a state.”198 
Against this backdrop, Norway devised its “liberal peace building” plan with a CFA in 
2002 between the LTTE and GOSL. The main objective of the CFA was to find a 
common agreement between the GOSL and LTTE to end the ongoing conflict in the 
country. Similar to the Indian efforts, Norway, too, committed the grave error of 
negotiating only with GOSL and the LTTE, while bypassing Muslims and other 
politically elected Tamil parties.199 Despite numerous efforts by Muslim leadership, 
neither the government nor the LTTE included any substantial Muslim representation at 
the CFA; besides, the LTTE claimed its position as the sole representative of the Tamil-
speaking community.200 According to Jonathan Goodhand, the CFA was mainly focused 
on “thorny issues” of the Sinhala-Tamil problem in the North and East of the country.201  
As per the agreement, the Norwegian government appointed a group of 
Scandinavian officials to oversee the CFA, which became known as Sri Lanka 
Monitoring Mission (SLMM). While maintaining its head office at Colombo, SLMM 
maintained its staff in every part of the North and East, “except LTTE strongholds of 
Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu,” giving the Tamil Tigers the freedom of action.202 Thus, 
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many scholars view the CFA as “the policy of appeasement” of the LTTE.203 In response 
to the event, the LTTE grossly violated the CFA during this period. In 2003, the Tamil 
tigers committed 1955 ceasefire violations, mainly child recruitments through 
abductions.204  
Within this context, Norwegian negotiators organized three preliminary 
discussions with parties from May 2002 to August 2002 at Killinochchi—as well as the 
UK and Norway. From September 2002 to March 2003, six rounds of talks were 
conducted between both parties at Norway, Thailand, Japan, and Germany. Owing to its 
commitment, the Sri Lankan government de-listed LTTE as a terrorist organization in 
2002 and created a conducive environment for peace negotiations. To everyone’s dismay, 
these discussions were largely confined to agreements that were never implemented, 
including a total donor pledge of 70 million USD in immediate humanitarian aid.205  
At one point, the LTTE delegation had agreed to a federal solution within a 
unitary country, but it was “livid” at Prabhakaran for not consulting about it.206 As a 
result, in 2003 the LTTE submitted its one and only comprehensive political plan for a 
Self-Governing Authority (ISGA), which constitutes “a separate sovereign state in the 
north and east of Sri Lanka rather than a formula for sharing power between the center 
and region within a unitary state.”207 Many national political leaders of the Sinhalese, 
Muslims, and even moderate Tamils viewed the ISGA as a looming threat to Sri Lanka’s 
sovereignty and an emerging security threat for the region and international trade (LTTE 
claimed control of two-thirds of the coastal line of the country that directly fall under 
international shipping lanes). Additionally, due to the fear of marginalization and against 
the ongoing LTTE attacks, Muslims in the east demanded a separate nation that did not 
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accommodate to the Norwegian model. As a result, scholars believe that Norway’s 
conflict resolution efforts in Sri Lanka were responsible for intensifying the growing 
clashes between the Tamils and the Muslims in the east and the third nation building 
process in the country.208  
In retrospect, the Norwegian effort brought many prospects to Sri Lanka. Relative 
calm on the battlefront saved many lives. Increased international assistance opened the 
floodgates for “peace-aid” to flow into the country. But why did the liberal peace process 
fail? As per the initial assessment, the LTTE’s maximal agenda of a separate Tamil 
Eelam and the GOSL’s domestic political turmoil experienced “liberal reforms [that] had 
illiberal consequences.”209 Johnathan Gooddhand argues, “The fate of liberal peace 
resonated with other liberal reforms in Sri Lanka, which were implemented unevenly and 
tended to produce paradoxical effects”210 at the end. The author accuses Norway of not 
being able to resolve the fundamental clash of ideas between the local and the 
international peacebuilding actors. Additionally, the LTTE considers the process an 
internationally laid “peace trap,” which curtailed its freedom of maneuver (this argument 
is equally applicable to the GOSL)211; hence, it blamed the international community for 
being biased toward the GOSL.212 There is reasonable truth to this claim because the 
GOSL linked the peace process to an international safety net in order to subdue the 
LTTE.213 Prabhakaran’s representatives made a similar excuse while leaving the process 
by not attending the donor conference organized by Japan, the United States, UK, and the 
E.U at Japan in 2003. Amid the LTTE’s joking over the Norwegian effort and its ISGA 
demands, the political leadership of Sri Lanka refused to continue the process; hence, the 
president used executive powers to dissolve the parliament. This standoff between the 
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GOSL and LTTE, allowed for the creation of a “no-peace-no-war” vacuum at the 
conflict. 
A ray of hope for a negotiation between the LTTE and GOSL was visible in the 
aftermath of the tsunami in 2004.214 However, the disagreement between the two parties 
over the control of financial aids of the Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure 
(P-TOMS) diminished the last chance for reconciliation. Meanwhile, the split in the 
LTTE’s military leadership (Karuna’s defection)215 considerably weakened the power 
structure in the organization and increased the ceasefire violations due to “intra-Tamil 
fractional conflicts.”216 Many scholars assume that the defection of Karuna had “shifted 
the military balance decisively in the government’s favor.”217 The LTTE further lost its 
grip on the international stage due to the U.S. directed “war on terror” strategy.218  
Meanwhile, the LTTE used CFA to re-build and re-arm the organization. C. A. 
Chandraprema acknowledges this by quoting the U.S State department’s report in 2002: 
“LTTE is taking advantage of the CFA to strengthen its position militarily through 
recruiting, training programs, and weapon supply.”219 Against this backdrop, a 
nationalist political leadership under the President Mahinda Rajapaksa of United People’s 
Freedom Alliance (UPFA) came to power with the support of such ultranationalist 
political parties as Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU, predominantly led by Buddhist monks). 
In 2005, Rajapaksa government tried to commence negotiations with LTTE on several 
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occasions, but was frustrated due to the intense terrorist activities of the Tamil Tigers and 
changed his peace building agenda into “war for peace.”220  
B. RECONCILIATION EFFORTS OF THE UPFA GOVERNMENT: PRE- 
AND POST-CONFLICT PERIODS 
Amid the LTTE CFA violations and provocation of government forces, the newly 
elected UPFA government continued the ongoing peace process by “tolerating the 
intolerable.”221 During the first few months of the UPFA government under the CFA 
(2005–2006), the LTTE killed 81 civilians and 67 government military personnel and 
injured more than 200; these attacks included suicide-bomb attempts on the Sri Lankan 
Army commander and the Pakistani High Commissioner and the assassination of the 
deputy commander of the Sri Lankan Army.222 However, the government was dedicated 
to the peace process; President Rajapaksa declared, “No other president would have acted 
the way I have in a situation like this.”223 On the president’s direction, a number of 
emissaries reached out to Prabhakaran to negotiate a genuine CFA. Additionally, during 
this period, the LTTE and GOSL conducted two rounds of peace negotiations in Norway, 
though without any substantial results. In the meantime, the ground realities indicated 
imminent war signs on both sides. 
Finally, the LTTE committed its major CFA violation in July 2006 by closing one 
of the main irrigation reservoirs in the Eastern province—cutting off the water supply to 
9,510 Muslims, 8,013 Sinhalese, and 4,439 Tamils in 20 villages.224 In retaliation, the 
newly elected government launched a full-scale military campaign to eradicate the 
terrorist organization that they considered as “the overarching threat and enemy to Sri 
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Lankan polity and society.”225 In so doing, the GOSL officially abrogated the CFA in 
2008 and launched its “biggest humanitarian operation to rescue more than 330,000 
Tamil civilians who were deliberately used by the LTTE as a human shield.”226In its 
latest attempt to defeat the LTTE, the Sri Lankan government mainly dealt with China 
and Pakistan for military and technical support, while maintaining western support for the 
conduct of military operations through diplomatic skills. After a series of battles in May 
2009, the LTTE lost its last stronghold in Nandikandal by giving victory to the 
government forces, while promising peace and economic stability in the country—amid 
questions about the permanency of peace and international accusations of human rights 
violations. 
At the very outset, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon said that “he was deeply 
trouble by civilian deaths.” In June 2010, he appointed the Secretary-General’s Panel of 
Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka, commonly known as the Darusman panel (after 
the chairman of the committee, Marzuki Darusman) to “advise him on the issue of 
accountability with regard to any alleged violations of international human rights and 
humanitarian law during the final stages of conflict.”227 At the end of the panel’s 
investigations, the Darusman Report tallied “as many as 40,000 civilian deaths” between 
September 2008 and May 19, 2009, and accused both the LTTE and Sri Lankan military 
for contributing to this human disaster.228 In denial of these allegations, the government 
announced its own total of “7896 deaths due to unnatural causes (January–May 2009) 
including LTTE cadres killed in action.”229 Against this backdrop, the GOSL devised its 
peace-building strategy, giving priority to reconciliation, political liberalization for the 
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Tamil political parties, resettlement of the internally displaced people (IDP), and 
rehabilitation of the former LTTE members. 
1. Reconciliation and Retributive Justice 
As Sri Lankan citizens celebrated victory over the LTTE around the country, 
President Mahinda Rajapaksa addressed the parliament. While ensuring equality for all 
ethnic groups, he reiterated his commitment to peace in the country by stating, “We must 
find a homegrown solution to this conflict. That solution should be acceptable to all the 
communities.”230 He went on to say that, “it is necessary that the political solutions they 
need should be brought closer to them faster than any country or government in the world 
would bring.”231 With these words, the government put its post-war reconciliation efforts 
on the fast track. 
a. Lesson Learned and Reconciliation Commission 
President Rajapaksa appointed the Lesson Learned and Reconciliation 
Commission (LLRC) in the first year after the conflict on May 15, 2010. The LLRC was 
comprised of a retired attorney general as its chairman and seven members to represent 
the Sinhalese, the Tamils, and the Muslims.232 The commission’s mandate “was to look 
back at the conflict Sri Lanka suffered as well as to look ahead for an era of healing and 
peace building in the country.”233 This mission included inquiry into the “facts and 
circumstances which led to the failure of the Ceasefire Agreement operationalized on 21 
February 2002 and the sequence of events that followed thereafter up to the 19 May 
2009,” and strove to identify the perpetrators while proposing a means of compensation 
for the victims.234  
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The LLRC compiled its recommendations based on the evidence it collected 
through “representatives” hearings of the public, people from affected areas, NGOs, 
INGOs, field work visits, and by referring to national and international organizational 
reports (Including UN Secretary General’s Panel of Expert Accountability in Sri Lanka, 
Channel 4 documentary movie on HR violations in the final stage of the battle in Sri 
Lanka). Additionally, the commission maintained transparency by opening the hearings 
to the public and the media.235  
At the end of the hearing, the LLRC submitted its findings and 285 
recommendations covering the 2002 CFA, International Humanitarian Law issues at the 
final stage of the battle, Human Rights, land issues (return and resettlement), restitution, 
and reconciliation (post-conflict issues and way forward).236 However, the commission 
reiterated that in order to achieve the desired result in post-conflict Sri Lanka, “the 
Government and all political leaders must manifest political will and sincerity of purpose 
to take the necessary decisions to ensure the good-faith implementation of the 
Commission’s recommendations.”237 Subsequently, the mounting pressure of alleged 
human rights violations on the GOSL compelled the president to appoint another 
commission to investigate complaints of civilian deaths and casualties that occurred at the 
final stage of the battle under the 4.359 of the LLRC report. 
b. Paranagama Commission 
The Presidential Commission of Inquiry, better known as the Paranagama 
Commission (named after the chairman of the committee, Maxwell Paranagama), was 
appointed by President Rajapaksa in August 2013 to “inquire into complaints of 
abductions and disappearances during the conflict in Sri Lanka.”238 In its initial mandate, 
the commission was appointed to investigate “complaints regarding Missing Persons.” It 
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was comprised of three members, headed by Paranagama (a retired judge), a Tamil, and a 
Sinhalese, and backed by an internationally recognized legal advisory council.239 During 
an inquiry into 2,700 complaints in July 2014, the commission found its mandate 
expanded to address “the facts and circumstances surrounding civilian loss of life and the 
question of the responsibility of any individual, group or institution for violations of 
international law during the conflict that ended in May 2009,” which is known as the 
Second Mandate.240  
However, due to ongoing international claims, the commission confined its focus 
to the “final phase of the operation,” even though the commission acknowledged this 
limitation was apt to “attract criticism,” mainly from the Sinhalese.241 In August 2015, 
the commission finalized the Second Mandate report. In the meantime, President 
Rajapaksa was out of power; thus, the results of this report are rightly classified among 
the reconciliation efforts of the unity government. 
2. Political Engagements 
One of the most significant moves at the political front for the reconciliation made 
by the Rajapaksa government is the conduct of the Northern Province elections after 25 
years. This election allowed Tamil National Alliance (TNA) to come to power, which 
many commentators claim as government failure to “win the hearts and minds” of the 
                                                 
239 Refer to the report on the Second Mandate Of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry Into 
Complaints of Abductions and Disappearances, 2015,xii, https://www.colombotelegraph.com/wp-content/
uploads/2015/10/Paranagama-Report-.pdf. 
240 Ibid. 
241 “The decision to restrict the temporal scope of the Second Mandate is based on several 
considerations. Most importantly, the principal questions raised in the Second Mandate relate to the period 
identified as the ‘final phase of the war’. Additionally, the panel of experts appointed by the United Nations 
Secretary-General on 22 June 
“2010 (‘Darusman Panel’) was tasked with reporting on the obligations relating to accountability 
arising from the ‘last stages of the war’.5 Further, on 8 May 2015, the current Sri Lankan Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Mangala Samaraweera, spoke of the government’s responsibility ‘to get at the root of all 
that had transpired during the closing stages of the war’.6 Finally, on 13 May 2015, the German Foreign 
Minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, called for a ‘credible domestic investigation of war crimes, during the 
last stages of the war.’ Therefore, noting both the domestic and international concern to address issues of 
accountability arising from the final stages of the conflict in Sri Lanka, this Commission will confine this 
section of its report to this relevant time frame.” Paranagama Report, 2015. 7 
 55
Tamils due to its slow progress to address the core issues to the conflict.242 Additionally, 
the government formed an all-party parliamentary selection committee “to discuss the 
recommendations of LLRC report, contested to the 13th Amendment to the constitution, 
and the devolution of power.”243 However, TNA purposely lessened its participation, 
claiming the government’s unwillingness over the devolution of power.  
Most importantly, in 2011 the government lifted the emergency law (that gave 
substantial powers to the military), with much praise from India and the western 
nations.244 In addition, the government brought former LTTE military leaders Karuna 
Amman and Pillayan, with their political parties, into mainstream politics, appointing the 
former as a cabinet minister and the latter as the chief minister in the Eastern province. 
Apart from its political moves, the GOSL conducted a number of reconciliation 
initiatives through social dialogue and political reforms. For example, in 2013, the 
Ministry of Education abolished the establishment of new schools on the basis of 
ethnicity. 
3. Resettlement and Social Infrastructure Development 
In order to assist the people in the war-ravaged Eastern and Northern provinces, 
the GOSL appointed a Presidential Task Force by including government institutions, 
international organizations (UN and International Organization for Migration), and 
national and international NGOs.245 The government’s program in the East during 2007 
bore the programmatic title of “reawakening of the east” (Nagenahira navodaya), and the 
program in the North was called “the northern spring” (uthuru wasanthaya). Both efforts 
aimed to stabilize and normalize the Northern and Eastern regions within a short period 
of time. For example, the government pursued a 180-day program at an initial cost of 
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$360.3 million in the North, for the resettlement of 280,000 IDP due to the final phase of 
the battle, while spending approximately $1,840 for resettlement and infrastructure 
development in the East.246  
As a result of the fast-tracked effort, by March 2015, the GOSL was able to 
resettle 270,230 IDPs in their original locations.247 Large-scale social infrastructure 
development projects concluded within a period of five years, including roads, railway 
tracks, bridges, irrigation reservoirs, schools, electricity, water, and institutions such as 
courts, local administrative hubs, police posts, etc.248 The Sri Lanka Census and the 
Statistics Department’s 2015 report identify Jaffna as one of the fastest growing cities in 
the country.249 Additionally, the government recruited more than 2,000 Tamil-speaking 
police officers to the Eastern province, and from 2013–2014 the Sri Lankan Army 
absorbed 150 Tamil youths from the North in its latest recruitment drive.250  
In addition to government efforts, the Sri Lankan Army assisted the government 
in building infrastructure, de-mining, and restoring security in the North and East regions 
of the country. In her landmark book, Sri Lanka: The New Country, Indian scholar Padma 
Rao Sudarjee commended the Army for building 15,000 houses for the Tamils in the 
Northern region.251 At the end of 2014, military engineers, in collaboration with 
international partners, cleared mines in the Northern Province, bringing the total area of 
minefields down from 506 square kilometers to 78 square kilometers as part of the 
government’s effort to make the country “mine threat free” by 2020.252 Additionally, the 
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government appointed retired senior military officers as the governors and district 
secretaries in the North and East because an “armed forces background provides the 
governor with the capacity to link his political office with professional oversight” of 
reconstruction efforts in these regions.253  
4. Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) of LTTE 
Members 
At the end of the conflict, the GOSL reported that 12,000 LTTE cadres either 
surrendered or were detained by troops; this total included 594 child soldiers.254 All the 
adult ex-combatants underwent two years of rehabilitation before they were re-integrated 
into society, whereas child combatants stayed in the program for one year. This program 
mainly focused on the “psycho-social and socio-economic profiling” of the ex-militants. 
The president granted amnesty for all rehabilitated LTTE members while retaining 
perpetrators who were directly involved in human rights violations in support of the 
restorative justice process in the reconciliation model. 
The government launched a “6+1 model: educational rehabilitation, vocational 
rehabilitation, psychological and creative therapies for rehabilitation; social, cultural, and 
family rehabilitation, spiritual and religious rehabilitation, recreational rehabilitation and 
community engagement”255 for the rehabilitation of former LTTE combatants in 24 
Protective Accommodation and Rehabilitation Centers (PARCs) around the country. In 
an interview in 2011, the minister for rehabilitation and prison reform, D. E. W. 
Gunasekara, declared that, “during the period of August 2009 to August 2010, a total 
number of 4,485 LTTE carders have been rehabilitated and released.” He further stated 
that 800–900 hardcore carders have been held for further investigations.256 (In 2011, the 
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total number of rehabilitees in all categories fell to about 3,000.257) Similarly, with the 
assistance of INGOs, NGOs, and private sector organizations, the government spent 
$9,136,370 on the DDR efforts from 2009 to 2012.258 Additionally, in 2011 the 
government provided employment for about 700 ex-LTTE combatants by establishing 
garment factories at the towns of Jaffna, Mulaitiuv, and Killinochchi.259  
Apart from its reconciliation efforts, the UPFA government maintained healthy 
economic indicators in the country; “economic growth averages 7 percent a year since the 
end of the civil war in 2009, with inflation declining along with unemployment, poverty, 
and inequality.”260 Per capita GDP increased from the equivalent of 869 USD in 2000 to 
3,256 USD in 2013.261 However, this economic divide did not equally distribute within 
the country due to the slow progress of reconciliation efforts. 
C. NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL REACTION TO THE UPFA 
GOVERNMENT’S RECONCILIATION EFFORTS 
Notwithstanding its success on IDP re-settlement, the comprehensive DDR plan, 
basic infrastructure development in the North and East, and limited political devolution, 
the GOSL came under heavy criticism from national and international observers due to 
its reluctance to address the core issues of the conflict: meaningful power devolution 
among the Tamils, good governance, minority rights protection, and economic inequality 
in the North and East.262 Many scholars argue that the UPFA government basically 
“violated the cardinal principle that a military victory must [be] followed by a political 
solution.”263 Notwithstanding to its firm commitment to rebuild the economy of the 
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country, the Sri Lankan government’s economic policies had come under heavy criticism 
for the mounting debts and escalating cost of living. Further, economists question the 
absence of post-war dividends among the majority of the people in the country. Similarly, 
the Darusman Report notes, “LLRC is deeply flawed, does not meet international 
standards for an effective mechanism”; thus, the panel refused to accept the work of the 
commission. In response to the UN report, Sri Lanka, along with eight countries 
(Pakistan, Cuba, Algeria, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Philippines, Russia, and China),264 
condemned the report as “controversial” and refused to accept the report at the UNHCR 
council even as an “informative document.”265  
The most vociferous criticism against the government came from the TNA, South 
Indian pro-LTTE political groups, and the Tamil diaspora. All of these groups demanded 
a credible international panel to investigate the 40,000 civilian deaths reported in the 
Darusman report. Similarly, the tussle between the government and the TNA had further 
intensified over the Supreme Court’s decision to a demerger of the Northern and Eastern 
provinces in 2007.266 As a result, TNA boycotted the 2008 provincial elections. Apart 
from the political struggle with TNA, many foreign states, organizations, and right 
groups criticized GOSL for continuation of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), 
human rights violations, corruptions, the increased militarization in the north and East, 
competitive authoritarianism due to the 18th Amendment to the constitution, and the 
triumphalist mindset of the government leaders.267As a result, these international 
organizations intensified their pressure through economic restrictions. In 2009, the 
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European Union exempted Sri Lanka from access to the Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP) plus trade facility due to human rights related issues (in 2010, the 
country’s garment industry lost 782 million USD). Similarly, in 2014 the European 
Union imposed a fish ban on the island, causing it to suffer a loss of 100 million USD 
annual income in fish exports.268 Meanwhile, after assuming office as the Prime Minister 
of India, Narendra Singh Modi insisted that the Sri Lankan government implement the 
13th amendment to the constitution, which promotes more political powers for the Tamils 
in the North and East of the country. Although President Rajapaksa promised a “13 plus” 
solution to give further concessions, WikiLeaks revealed that the New Delhi government 
was “skeptical” of this promise and, as expected, the Sri Lankan government made little 
progress in its efforts.269 
Similarly, these groups claimed Tamil’s owned lands in government established 
high-security zones (HSZ) in the North.270 The GOSL rejected these claims while 
highlighting the necessity of a continued security presence in the North and East for a 
number of reasons: the ongoing de-mining process by the military, tracing large caches of 
LTTE hidden arsenals, supporting reconstruction efforts, and preventing a remnant LTTE 
threat to civilians.271 While many scholars view increased military involvement in 
government sponsored projects in the North and East as undermining of regional civilian 
authority, the government perceived the military as a resourceful and disciplined 
workforce that has the capacity to expedite its efforts with less time and money.272  
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Additionally, in 2011, the government opened all HSZs for the public while 
removing some military installations from the Tamils’ owned properties.273 However, the 
GOSL came under continued pressure from the West, including a U.S.-sponsored 
resolution in a 2013 UNHRC session to encourage Sri Lanka to mount or allow credible 
investigations into human rights violations in the conflict while claiming to thin-out its 
military presence in the North and East. Similarly, watchdogs perceived Sri Lanka’s risk 
factor as moderate and placed the country at the 105th position in the global peace index 
in 2014. In general, many commentators believe that Sri Lanka gradually lost its Western 
allies for the ways it dealt—and did not deal—with Tamils after the conflict. 
D. RECONCILIATION EFFORTS OF THE UNITY GOVERNMENT 
Despite his war victories and effective development programs in the country, 
President Mahinda Rajapaksa and his UPFA government lost their mandate in the 2015 
elections, leaving the door open for a more pro-western UNP and the “unity government” 
leadership in the country. For the first time in history, the two major political parties of 
the country (the UNP and SLFP, along with the minority Muslims and up-country Tamil 
political parties), have joined forces in government. However, within a limited majority 
and period of two years (the term was extended from January 2016 to January 2020), yet 
promising new prospects for the reconciliation process in the country. 
The unity government did not include the extremist pro-LTTE political party, 
which had failed to win a single seat in the North and East.274 President Mathripala 
Sirisena won a majority of the Tamil and Muslim votes; however, the election results 
indicate Sinhala nationalist support for the former president, which could pose a major 
challenge for the newly elected president when launching his reconciliation efforts.275  
Many Western nations welcomed the political change in Sri Lanka and pinned 
their hopes on the revival of a meaningful reconciliation process for permanent peace to 
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the Sinhalese and the Tamil conflict. Soon after it came to power on a platform of 
yahapalanaya (good governance), the new government laid out its ambitious political 
agenda: “restoring the rule-of-law and ending impunity for corruption and abuse of 
power; a new constitution, a complex package of post-conflict reconciliation, justice 
mechanism agreed with the UNHCR, and major policy changes to jump-start a 
beleaguered economy.”276 According to the government’s post-election economic 
pledges on subsidiaries and increased welfare payments, some scholars believe that “the 
absence of offsetting revenue gains would jeopardize Sri Lanka’s hard-won progress in 
reducing its large debt and interest burden”277; thus, the government faced a formidable 
challenge to strike a delicate balance between incentives and economic reforms when 
satisfying its political support. Consequently, the government started its journey to build 
confidence among the Tamils in government institutions, such as the judiciary and 
parliament. 
After less than a year in power, the unity government made some substantial 
policy changes regarding reconciliation between the Sinhalese and the Tamils. Among 
these efforts, parliament appointed a Tamil political leader as the opposition leader of the 
county. Similarly, Tamils took up such positions as Chief Justice and governor of the 
central bank. More than 23 percent of government ministerial posts were allocated to 
Tamils and Muslims.278 Additionally, for the first time since independence, the Sri 
Lankan national anthem was sung in the Tamil language during the independence parade 
in 2015, to further identify the language parity between the Sinhala and the Tamil. 
Meanwhile, after its demerger in 2007, TNA participated in the Eastern provincial 
council elections in 2015 and decided to share power between the UNP and the Sri Lanka 
Muslim Congress (SLMC), appointing a Muslim as the chief minister in the region. 
Furthering its reconciliation efforts, the government released about 1,000 acres of 
land to the Tamils in the North within a year and removed the number of HSZs and 
military establishments to allow the locals to attend their routine life without 
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interference.279 Additionally, the unity government took measures to accelerate the legal 
proceedings of the LTTE detainees who languished in long jail terms and released a new 
batch of rehabilitated ex-LTTE combatants after the DDR process. Similarly, the 
government switched the Northern Province governor’s post, held by an ex-military 
officer, with a civilian administrator. The international community, along with the Tamil 
political parties in the region, welcomed this move.by. Moreover, the government 
reduced the direct and aggressive involvement of the military in civilian affairs in the 
North and East, which stakeholders viewed as a positive step in the de-militarization 
process. 
Next, the government added a 19th amendment to the constitution that reduced the 
power of the executive by establishing independence commissions for the judiciary, 
police, human rights, and election commission. Additionally, the new amendment limited 
the presidential term and increased the powers of the prime minister. This power shift is 
important to bring stability to the coalition government, which enjoys a limited majority 
because it includes many ministers of former government who have a tendency to 
crossover for political gains. Similarly, the government established a constitutional 
council in order to bring fresh reforms to the constitution and achieve “distributive 
justice, including in political economic and social spheres.”280 Additionally, the council 
will oversee the appointments to the independent commissions. Moreover, the new 
government appointed human rights advocates for the long-pending vacancies on the 
commission of human rights. It also released two presidential commission reports on 
human rights violations: Paranagama First Mandate report and Second Mandate report. 
During the 2015 UNHCR session, Sri Lanka took a giant leap in signing a 
resolution along with the United States and other partners on “shared recognition of the 
critical importance of truth, justice, reparations, and guarantees of non-recurrence in 
promoting reconciliation and ensuring an enduring peace and prosperity for all Sri 
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Lankans.”281 In the same year, to the satisfaction of much of the Tamil community, the 
GOSL established the Office of Missing Persons (OMP) to gather data for the missing 
persons in the country during the conflict and decided to certify the victims’ status as 
“missing” rather than “deceased” in order to provide more benefits for the dependents.282 
Moreover, the government initiated actions to establish the Consultation Task Force on 
Reconciliation Mechanism (CTFRM), and opened dialogue with the public (including the 
Sri Lankan diaspora) to seek suggestions for the design of the reconciliation 
mechanism.283 The government envisaged OMP, truth and reconciliation, a Justice and 
Non-recurrence Commission (JNC), an accountability mechanism, and an office of 
reparation in its new mechanism.284 Similarly, the government pledged to replace the 
much-debated PTA with a watered-down national Security Act, along with a Witness and 
Victim Protection Law.285  
As a result of these new developments, many Western nations commended the 
new government’s efforts, which allowed the country to repair the deteriorated 
relationship among the U.S.-led west. Thereby, in 2016 the EU lifted its imposed ban on 
Sri Lankan fish exports and assured its commitment to re-instate the GSP plus at the end 
of the year. In contrast, Sri Lanka’s main international investor, China, cautioned the 
country on UN sponsored reconciliation efforts. The Chinese ambassador to Sri Lanka 
slammed UN efforts by stating that, “it would be ill advised to put reconciliation before 
development because it is only all round equitable development which will prevent 
social, political, and economic conflict,” which further highlights the strategic interest of 
Beijing in the island. Tamil political parties continued to push the government via 
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international actors to implement constitutional reforms for devolution and the 
establishment of an international panel to prosecute human rights violators in the conflict. 
Additionally, the Sinhalese nationalists who backed the former government accused the 
government of giving in to the Tamil’s demands and intensified their campaign through 
demonstrations and strikes. Notwithstanding these demands, president Sirisena’s 
collation government made every effort to strike a balance between the Tamils and the 
Sinhala nationalist elements while advancing its reconciliation efforts.  
Meanwhile, the country’s democratic indicators reflected positive signs in their 
ratings. According to the Freedom House report in 2016, “Sri Lanka’s political rights and 
civil liberties ratings each improved from 5 to 4, which the report maintains improved 
conditions for freedom of expression, religious freedom, civil society, and judicial 
independence under the new administration.”286 Similarly, the country’s rank in the 2016 
global peace index improved by 18 notches and was in 97th place out of 163 countries.287  
In less than two years in power, Sri Lanka’s first UNP-SLFP government had 
made few positive moves towards reconciliation, yet those few were significant. The 
government created a few important changes to the constitution through the 19th 
amendment and took initiative to activate CTFRM to strengthen the reconciliation 
process. The unity government also made some bold decisions to de-militarize the North 
and East by reducing HSZs and releasing lands occupied by the military to the Tamils. 
Also, the government concentrated its reconciliation efforts to win the confidence of the 
Tamil community by bringing many Tamil politicians and intellectuals to the forefront of 
the government’s machinery. While strengthening its ties with the west, the government 
created similar relationships with international organizations such as the UN and 
UNHCR. As a result, unlike in the past, the GOSL could muster international support for 
its reconciliation efforts. 
Despite these positive developments, the Sinhalese and the Tamil nationalists 
both directed accusations to the government. The Sinhalese feared the government’s 
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efforts would compromise national security and integrity, while the Tamils accused the 
government of not keeping its promise on devolution and accountability. As a result, Sri 
Lanka’s unity government makes slow but steady progress at striking a balance between 
the aspirations of the Tamils and Sinhalese, while preserving their marginal 
parliamentary advantage over the opposition. While praising the Sri Lankan 
government’s effort, Ban Ki-Moon, in his last appearance as the Secretary General of the 
UN, agrees that, “there remains much hard work ahead.”288 Moon’s statement will truly 
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IV. TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Today, South Africans have embarked on another journey. Some travel 
joyfully into the future. Others still carry their baggage, uncertain of 
whether or how to dispose of it. Thus, although it is a collective journey, it 
is also an individual journey. A journey that depends on our ability to 
examine with honesty and with humility the role we have played in the 
past and, more importantly, what role we can as individuals and as 
institutions play in the future. 
—Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report289 
The inspirational “Satyagraha” campaign of Mahatma Gandhi in 1906 made 
South Africans believe that ethnic and racial discrimination could be defeated through 
truth and love.290 In 1996, Archbishop Desmond Tutu spearheaded a similar non-violent 
reckoning with apartheid atrocities in South Africa by promoting acceptance, tolerance, 
and reconciliation by acknowledging the past. The mechanism was the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission. Tutu viewed the TRC as a “third way,” a middle ground 
between a criminal tribunal and “national amnesia.”291 Crucially, the commission strikes 
a balance between the survivor and the perpetrator while attracting global attention, “as it 
was the first commission to hold public hearings in which both victims and perpetrators 
were heard.”292 Scholars have come to view the establishment of a truth commission as 
“the official symbol of a political transition.”293 
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The South African constitution shaped the first democratic elections of 1994, with 
the following clause: 
The adoption of this Constitution lays the secure foundation for the people 
of South Africa to transcend the divisions of strife of the past, which 
generated gross violations of human rights, the transgression of 
humanitarian principles in violent conflicts and a legacy of hatred, fear, 
guilt, and revenge. These can now be addressed on the basis that there is a 
need for understanding but not for vengeance, a need for reparation but 
not for retaliation, a need for Ubuntu (the African philosophy of 
humanism) but not for victimization. In order to advance such 
reconciliation and reconstruction, amnesty shall be granted in respect of 
acts, omissions and offences associated with political objectives and 
committed in the course of the conflicts of the past.294 
The Constitutional explanation was sufficient to conduct the elections, and it 
paved the way to establish the TRC in South Africa under the auspicious leadership of 
President Nelson Mandela. 
The South African TRC learned from 15 similar commissions between 1974 and 
1994 in such countries as Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Uruguay, El Salvador, Rwanda, 
Ethiopia, Chad, Zimbabwe, Germany, and the Philippines. These countries not only 
transitioned from authoritarian governments, but also sought justice for the systematic 
violations of the human rights of a large number of citizens including mass killings, 
abductions, torture, and disappearance by former regimes.295 Similarly, from 1979 to 
1993, 11 Latin American countries transformed from authoritarianism to democracy and 
exposed similar types of abuses against humanity.  
Moreover, the South African TRC formed with “the most expansive mandate, the 
widest powers, the greatest resources, and the largest professional staff.”296 In order to 
find the context of historical oppression and exploitation of the Apartheid rule from 1960 
to 1994, the commission organized four main offices around the country with 350 staff 
members. They successfully concluded testimonies of 1,819 victims through the public 
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hearings of 22,000 statement holders, while denying amnesty for 806 perpetrators out of 
1,973 applicants.297 Unlike any other TRCs around the world, the commission had the 
powers for amnesty, subpoena of search and seizure, institutional and special hearings 
with “non-victim” public actors, and witness protection.298 Thus, the South African TRC 
“dwarfed previous truth commissions in its size and reach,”299 thereby making it unique 
throughout the process.300 
Given the importance of the South African TRC, it is important to ask: does the 
South African TRC have relevance to Sri Lanka? I would argue that, although it has a 
few unresolved issues, the South African TRC largely kick-started reconciliation in the 
country and provides many procedures and functional aspects that could possibly apply 
within the Sri Lankan context. Therefore, this chapter explores the commission and 
identifies factors relevant to Sri Lanka. First, I will briefly sketch the TRC in South 
Africa, and then study the mechanism and findings of the TRC, followed by the TRC’s 
impact on the reconciliation process in the country. Finally, this chapter explores the 
lessons learned from the TRC and its implications in post-conflict countries around the 
world.  
A. BACKGROUND  
Due to the multicultural, multilinguistic, and multiethnic nature of its society, 
South Africa is known as the “Rainbow Nation.” Blacks dominate society, divided 
among a number of ethnic groups: Xhosa, Zulu, Pedi, Tswana, Sotho, and others.301 
Whites primarily consist of two distinct groups: Dutch-origin Afrikaners and British-
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origin English, who both settled in the country as colonizers in 1652 and 1820, 
respectively.302 Apart from these groups, colored or mixed-race people and immigrants 
from east India, commonly referred to as “Indians, or Asians,” comprise the other 
minority groups in the country.303 
The institutionalized racial marginalization of the blacks originated in the 
Afrikaners government of 1948. The Afrikaner National Party (ANP) legally instituted 
the process known as apartheid (“apartness” in Afrikaans), or racial separation. Hugo van 
der Merwe in his landmark book, Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Did the TRC 
Deliver? states: 
Apartheid system of compulsory racial separation enabled a white 
minority, amounting to some 13 percent of the population, to monopolize 
economic and political power and to relegate the black majority, 
constituting 75 percent of the population, to a subordinate and politically 
powerless status. It also marginalized the two other major population 
groups: people from mixed races…who comprised about 3 percent of the 
population.304 
Institutionalized white supremacy created “deep psychological scars and distrust 
between groups,” which exist to this day.305 
Many apartheid laws were enacted to suppress the Black South Africans while 
totally exploiting the land (including one third of the world’s gold reserves) and the 
nation for white supremacy. Van der Merwe and Audrey Chapman point out the 
“elaborate set of laws that reserved 87 percent of the land and virtually all natural 
resources to the white population and skewed access to good quality education, decent 
medical care, and well-paying jobs to the white minority.”306 The ANP government used 
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the military and the police services to prevent an uprising against the apartheid system, 
mainly by imprisonment, torture, and disappearance. Acknowledging this fact, Van Der 
Merwe states, “NGO HR organizations estimate that as many as two hundred thousand 
South Africans were arrested between 1960 and 1992, many of whom were tortured 
while in detention.”307  
Apartheid, as well as the process by which it ended, met with increasing violence 
throughout the years. According to the HRC statistics, “21,000 people died in political 
violence in South Africa during apartheid—of which 14,000 people died during the six-
year transition process from 1990 to 1994.”308 In the guise of counterterrorism, the South 
African state intelligence service or the Bureau for State Security (BOSS) carried out a 
number of political assassinations of their opponents.309 In the aftermath of a failing 
military struggle, Mandela successfully rejuvenated his non-violent resistance movement 
with international support and sanctions to force the white government to enter 
negotiations. Following a historic election win in 1994, Mandela’s government in 1995 
adopted the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act by establishing the TRC 
in South Africa.310 
B. THE SOUTH AFRICAN TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE MODEL311 
The South African TRC most effectively captured public attention around the 
world, while designing a model for any truth commission to follow.312 The Promotion of 
National Unity and Reconciliation Act of 1995 covered a wide range of objectives 
beyond truth and recovery. These objectives mainly covered four additional measures in 
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the mandate: “creating a collective memory for the society, establishing and nurturing a 
culture of human rights in South Africa, transforming the society, and enhancing 
reconciliation, in addition to granting amnesty to those admitting to involvement in gross 
human rights violations.”313 Thus, “the TRC was the first truth commission mandated to 
balance truth finding with reconciliation.”314 According to James Gibson, the main truth 
recovery functions of the TRC were to establish: 
 As complete a picture as possible of the causes, nature and extent of the 
gross violations of human rights that were committed during the period 
between March 1960 and May 1994, including the antecedents, 
circumstances, factors and context of such violations, as well as the 
perspectives of the victims and the motives and perspectives of the 
persons responsible for the commission of the violations, by conducting 
investigations and holding hearings. 
 The commission’s report must be able to provide as thorough an account 
as possible of its activities and findings about the gross violations of 
human rights along with its execution of its other functions. 
 Apart from these functions, the act mandated that the TRC: 
 Promote national unity and reconciliation in a spirit of understanding that 
transcends the conflicts and divisions of the past. 
 Facilitate the granting of amnesty to persons who make full disclosure of 
all relevant facts related to violations associated with a political objective. 
 Restore the human and civil dignity of victims by granting them an 
opportunity to relate their own accounts of the violations affecting them 
and by recommending reparation measures in respect of them 
 Make recommendations to the president on measures to prevent future 
violations of human rights.315 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu and 17 commissioners began their work on the TRC 
in 1995. President Mandela appointed these commissioners following a public 
nomination and selection process that included lawyers, human rights activists, doctors, 
and ANC-defected (some of the members were former political figures of ANC 
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government and later defected due to the increased human rights violations of the 
government)316 politicians. The commission is formally constituted into three 
committees: a Human Rights violation committee, which was responsible for witness 
hearing and data collection on human rights violations, an Amnesty committee, which 
processed the amnesty application requests of the perpetrators, and a Reparations and 
Rehabilitation Committee (RRC) with selected eligible candidates for reparations. 
Similarly, an investigation unit was assigned to each committee, while a Research 
Department collected overall data. Apart from its substantive organizational structure, the 
TRC received an annual budget of $18 million from the state’s contribution and 
donations from USAID, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, Finland, Austria, Sweden, 
and the European Community.317 
Apart from its justice framework, Christian thought and traditions heavily 
influenced the South African TRC model.318 Among the South Africans, “Biblical 
language and Christian discourse resonate powerfully, and theological discourse on 
political matters is taken seriously.”319Therefore, from the beginning of the TRC process, 
the Christian church was concerned about reconciliation, confession, guilt, and 
forgiveness. 
Tutu believed the “witness hearing” process was an important function during the 
democratic transformation process in South Africa.320 The TRC “took 23000 victims and 
witnesses, 2000 of whom appeared in public hearing.”321 All of these public hearings 
received a wide range of national and international publicity through electronic and 
printed media. This large publicity was an important reason for the TRC to secure an 
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international recognition to its process. About ten to twelve survivors testified each day, 
mainly in townships, small towns, and city centers.322 
In all, the committee granted amnesty for 849 perpetrators out of 7,112 applicants, 
and others withdrew their applications.323 The Amnesty committee of the TRC process 
was a “unique innovation” deviating from the formal blanket amnesty practice, whereas it 
resorted to a strict scrutinizing process of the applicants only after hearing a full 
disclosure of the crime.324 “Crimes committed for personal gain or out of personnel 
malice, ill will or spite were not pardoned.”325 Due to the fear of consequences, many 
political leaders and military commanders of the apartheid regime did not appear before 
the commission.326 However, the “commission’s power of subpoena, search, and seizure 
were stronger than other commissions”; thus, the TRC had immense power to call 
witnesses and alleged perpetrators during the process.327 
At the end of the hearings, the TRC compiled its five-volume report and handed it 
over to President Mandela in October 1998, but the Amnesty committee worked through 
2001 and submitted the sixth volume in 2003. Among its primary findings, the TRC 
accused apartheid government of committing gross human rights violations by the use of 
security and low enforcement agencies. The TRC also accused the government of 
committing criminal activities from 1970 to 1990 in that it “knowingly planned, 
undertook, condoned and covered up the commission of unlawful acts, including the 
extra-judicial killings of political opponents and others inside and outside South 
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Africa.”328 Additionally, the commission found other political elements as collation 
partners of the government, most importantly the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP).329 
Meanwhile, the TRC accused the National Intelligence Agency of South Africa of 
the systematic destruction of sensitive documents covering the period of 1990–1994.330 
Similarly, the final commission report named the individual perpetrators along with their 
crimes.331So, why did many perceive that the South African TRC was a success? James 
L. Gibson identifies six reasons: 1) wider media coverage, 2) free participation of the 
victims, 3) impartiality of its decisions, 4) shared blame for all parties to the conflict, 5) 
retributive and distributive (compensation) justice, and 6) the roles of Tutu and 
Mandela.332 Thus, if a TRC is to be successful, it basically needs three aspects: 
transparency, impartiality, and political concession. 
C. TRC AND ITS IMPACT ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN RECONCILIATION 
PROCESS 
Ten years after the TRC process, researchers have found that the effect of the 
commission on South African reconciliation is “moderately positive.”333 Others, notably 
Jay A. Vora and Erika Vora in their statistical research on the Effectiveness of South 
Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Perceptions of Xhosa, Afrikaner, and 
English South Africans, reveal that with the exception of Xhosas, Afrikaners, and 
English, South Africans did not agree that the TRC was effective in bringing 
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reconciliation in the country.334 Even Tutu began to argue that it was not the promise of 
the commission to achieve reconciliation, but to “promote” it in the process.335 
Acknowledging the fact, in its first volume of the final report the TRC insists that, “truth 
reconciliation is not easy; it is not cheap”336; thus, the commission justified its action of 
victim hearing as the main approach to promoting meaningful reconciliation. Because, 
the commission conceptualized that the “truth contributes to reconciliation,” hence, 
reconciliation to consolidate the South African democracy.337 
In this context, the commission promoted the concept of the “truth” as a level of 
individual acceptance of the collective memory of the past, while “reconciliation” had 
four components: “(1) interracial reconciliation (rejection of interracial stereotypes and 
prejudice), (2) political tolerance (willingness to allow one’s political foes full rights of 
political contestation), (3) support for human rights principles (and, in particular, the rule 
of law), and (4) the extension of legitimacy to the political institutions of the New South 
Africa (Parliament and the Constitutional Court).”338 In retrospect, James L. Gibson 
argues, “Citizens participating more in the TRC’s truth are more likely to respect and 
trust those of other races, to tolerate those with different political views, to support the 
extension of human rights to all South Africans, and to extend legitimacy and respect to 
the major governing institutions of South Africa’s democracy”339; thus, achieving a 
relative success in the democratic consolidation of South Africa through reconciliation. 
In contrast to these views, some scholars identify a number of drawbacks in the 
TRC process. Paradoxically, the TRC report defines reconciliation as both a “goal and a 
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process” because the main task of the commission was to promote national unity and 
reconciliation.340 Nonetheless, in practice, the TRC made a little progress to promote 
reconciliation among rivals or competing groups by revealing the widely accepted 
version of the truth of historical events.341 Scholars reproached the mandate for not being 
specific about intended activities of the commission that influenced the reconciliation.342 
Similarly, Van der Merwe states that even “the legislation does not identify the parties 
that are to be reconciled… whether between races, the architects of apartheid and the 
remainder of the society, contending political movements and parties, or victims and 
perpetrators.”343 The commission worked mainly to bring micro-reconciliation or 
reconciliation between the victim and perpetrator. Thus, a continuous process of conflict 
resolution is necessary to build a macro-reconciliation on the foundation of the TRC.344 
Similarly, the TRC adopted four different conceptualizations of truth for its 
findings: “1) factual or forensic truth, 2) personal or narrative truth, 3) social or dialogue 
truth, and 4) healing and restorative truth.”345 The first one reflects the objective truth, 
whereas the other three types represent the subjective truth category Some scholars 
believe that the TRC deliberately undermined the objective truth in its process..346 Due to 
this particular approach, the TRC factually lacked evidence. Therefore, some scholars 
critically question the credibility of the commission’s findings based on “hearsay” 
evidence.347  
Politico-judicial and Christian clergies produced two different versions of 
reconciliation at the TRC process. Tutu influenced healing and forgiveness following 
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religious teachings, while the lawyers and politicians “equated reconciliation with the end 
of overt conflict.”348 These two concepts never harmonized during the public hearings, in 
the media, or at the final TRC report.349 Ultimately, the commission had no clear vision 
about a national unity and reconciliation, but tried to create an interpersonal one between 
the survivors and the perpetrators. Scholars acknowledge that in most instances, 
forgiveness, truth-telling, apologies, and the commissioner’s perceived new political 
culture (of human rights) were used as tools to promote reconciliation during the process, 
yet failed to make any meaningful connection.350 Though these hearings attracted public 
attention, Van der Merwe states, “[V]ery few whites attended the hearings. In some 
cases, the only whites were foreign observers and researchers.”351 Thus, the lack of white 
participation indicates that racial tension and fear psychosis prevailed among the society. 
The general perception of TRC was that it was not a process of promoting 
reconciliation, but a human rights violations hearing. Criminal justice practitioners argue 
that, “the institution of the TRC justifiably sacrificed justice to other ends, truth and 
reconciliation” because the South African TRC had to incorporate amnesty in its model 
in order to achieve compromise between the victims and apartheid rulers.352 As a result 
of the granting of amnesty and failure of the commission to prosecute the perpetrators, 
South Africans still feel that “revelations had … made them angrier and contributed to 
worsening of race relations.”353Similarly, during the process, the majority of the abusers 
did not show any remorse for their actions; thus, “over 65 percent of amnesty 
applications provided no-or only superficial-expression of remorse at their 
hearing.”354Despite the subpoena powers it had, the commission was unable to summon 
either P. W. Botha or a majority of high-ranking officials of the apartheid regime. 
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Consequently, while recovering and documenting truth, the commission ended up 
polarizing rival parties more than supporting reconciliation efforts. 
Many scholars argue that, “individuals with TRC relevant experience would 
simply be re-traumatized by participation in the process.”355 Sadly, there had not been 
adequate supportive measures available with the TRC to treat these post-traumatic 
stresses.356 
One of the biggest setbacks in the South African TRC was the lack of 
cohesiveness among the members at the final stage of the commission. As a result, many 
key figures in the commission disintegrated during the final report-compiling stage, and 
the report lacked cohesiveness. 
Many South Africans believe that since the end of the apartheid regime, little has 
changed in the police and other government institutions that warrant reconciliation in the 
country.357 Similarly, political marginalization and economic inequality are largely 
visible in South African society today.358 In recent history, South Africa made few 
controversial decisions against human rights violations in other countries. The 
Congressional Report of 2008 highlights that South Africa vetoed against UN resolutions 
for the human rights violations in Burma and Zimbabwe in 2007, which Tutu criticized as 
“deeply disappointed.”359 Thus, South Africa’s current human rights approach clearly 
indicates the lack of impact on the TRC in country’s polity. 
In contrast to these views, many scholars argue that apart from its criticisms, more 
positive signs emerged as a result of the TRC in South African society today. One of the 
most important outcomes of the TRC has been the ability to support the psychological 
                                                 
355 “The impact of the truth and reconciliation commission on psychological distress and forgiveness 
in south Africa,” NCBI, accessed November 07, 2016, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
PMC3222912/. 
356 Van der Merwe and Chapman, Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa, 289. 
357 Ibid., 67. 
358 Ibid., 287. 
359 Ploch, Lauren. “South Africa: Current Issues and U.S. Relations.” CRS Report for Congress. 
RL31697 October 2008. http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/112039.pdf. 
 80
distress of survivors and the perpetrators through “knowledge and acknowledgment of 
the past.”360 Richard Goldstone, an ardent supporter of the TRC, comments:  
If we had not had a truth commission, the denials of apartheid era abuses 
by members of the prior regime would no doubt continue to this day and 
still be believed by a large number of people. But in the aftermath of the 
truth commission, even the hard right wing of the apartheid regime can no 
longer deny the worst abuses.361 
James L. Gibson argues, “The presumption of South Africa’s truth and 
reconciliation process is that acceptance of the truth—participation in the collective 
memory unearthed by the truth and reconciliation process—contributes to 
reconciliation.”362 As a result, the TRC uncovered a great amount of information that 
largely supported the reconciliation process, and racial violence in South Africa is almost 
nonexistence today. 
Similarly, the TRC empowered the civil societies of South Africa. These civil 
societies actively involved in perusing government to implement the commission’s 
recommendations, while conducting community building programs to educate race and 
identity together, attempt to build dialogue among the divided communities. Many NGOs 
in South Africa conduct an awareness campaign about the government’s reactions to the 
TRC recommendations through social media networks. Paradoxically, the TRC remains a 
“reference point” for South Africa due to its symbolic nature as a reminder of the brutal 
past and the unfulfilled obligations of the government. 
D. LESSONS LEARNED AND IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER COUNTRIES 
During the conflict resolution process, a Truth commission was considered an 
official symbol of “beginning a political transition to a system with greater respect for 
human rights and the rule of law.”363 The South African TRC opted to find truth through 
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a public hearing process in order to identify the human rights violations of the apartheid 
regime and its institutions. During the period of its conduct, the commission had 
encountered a number of challenges and practitioners adopted them as “lessons learned” 
for their future studies. Similarly, scholars identified some flaws in the TRC mechanism. 
Therefore, these contradictions create lessons that are imperative for other countries to 
incorporate in their TRCs.  
The TRC used restorative justice as a conceptual framework to demonstrate its 
justice system because restorative justice “focuses on the rehabilitation of offenders 
through reconciliation with victims and the community at large.” Due to its high rate of 
victim satisfaction, a restorative justice system in a TRC model could effectively be used 
in post-conflict countries. 
Another important innovative aspect of the South African TRC is the institutional 
hearing. These hearings were mainly conducted in the health sector, media, and business 
community, and with lawyers and intellectuals to discover their level of involvement with 
the apartheid regime. This process is important to recover macro-truth, or the structural 
failures of the regime and its policies. Practitioners suggest research development with an 
investigation unit embedded in future TRCs for an effective macro-truth analyzing 
process in institutional hearings.364 Additionally, data should be made available to the 
public by documenting it in national archives. 
Similarly, the victim protection aspect of the TRC allowed many survivors to 
participate in the proceedings with confidence and without fear. Therefore, countries 
without victim protection in their legal system can benefit from the TRC process.  
Although the restorative justice adopted in the TRC was considered as an 
alternative to prosecuting perpetrators, the South African commission handed over its 
findings to the national Prosecuting Authority for further investigations. After nominating 
perpetrators in its final report, the South African government pressed criminal charges. 
Notwithstanding this judgment, it is fair to think that perpetrators in the future are going 
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to avoid voluntary testimonies. Therefore, it may be necessary to use TRC evidence 
against non-participants charged with gross human rights violations. 
This system had many limitations. The government’s refusal to continue its effort 
toward reparation represents one such limitation. The RRC of the commission 
recommended an annual grant of $3,500 (for six years) for each victim or family who 
appeared before the commission. Many commentators believed that the dramatic amount 
of victim participation reflected a quest for reparations.365 At the end, the South African 
government compensated “only 21, 000 [to] victims [$450 to each survivor] [which] was 
far lower than the amount recommended,” and refused to release the money reserved for 
the remaining sufferers.366 To avoid government interference, it is important to direct the 
reparation funds through a TRC process in the future.  
In general, South African society was frustrated and confused about the amnesty 
mechanism in the TRC.367 Many scholars view amnesty as an undermining factor of the 
commission’s credibility; therefore, they recommend that the amnesty commission have a 
separate mandate and an integrated justice system and operate separately from the 
TRC.368 Paradoxically, amnesty is largely important in a TRC in a post-conflict scenario, 
where an integrated justice system doesn’t exist. Similarly, amnesty is the appropriate 
means to clear names of falsely-accused perpetrators.  
The TRC was imbued with a broad mandate to be achieved in a very short time 
span, yet the precise path to reconciliation was not conceptualized in the mandate. As a 
result of over-mandating, the commission exceeded resources and capacity, conflicted 
with these findings, and undermined the effectiveness of recovering the truth. Therefore, 
in any TRC, the legislature must design a narrow and clearly-defined mandate. Since 
reconciliation is a long-lasting process, truth commission mandates should be designed to 
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achieve micro-reconciliation among individuals and reconciliation among a larger 
community. Also, the mandate needs to provide clear steps to achieve the basic 
objectives of the reconciliation. 
Many commentators identify that the South African TRC lacked psychological 
resources to handle the unprecedented level of post-traumatic stress of the victims during 
the truth-telling process.369 As a result, many survivors got frustrated and grew reluctant 
to support the commission. Thus, in the future, TRCs should include psychological 
counselling and support services.  
Essentially, the TRC used forgiveness as a theological framework, and a similar 
framework could be employed to other countries that practice forgiveness in religious 
teachings.  
Apart from its vested powers, due to resources, the South African TRC made its 
prominence among the other TRCs it followed. Most importantly, due to its huge 
financial support, the commission could maintain its sustainability amid criticisms. 
Similarly, widespread media coverage allowed the TRC to grab international recognition 
and attention. Thus, open hearings with a greater awareness plan could allow any TRC to 
obtain the much needed international recognition for wide acceptance of its findings and 
financial assistance. 
The South African TRC empowers many civil societies to be involved in the 
reconciliation process and brings the pending grievances to the notice of the international 
community. These social groups could effectively be used as monitoring sources to keep 
tabs on governments’ reactions to the TRC’s recommendations. 
Due to its impartial report and collective blame directed on all parties to the 
conflict, the South African TRC maintained a fair amount of political and public support 
throughout its operation. In many instances, the commission effectively battled against 
the political pressure created at various level of the government due to the effective role 
played by the Archbishop Tutu and President Mandela. Ideally, a recognized apolitical 
                                                 
369 Hamber, Mofokeng and Simpson, “ Evaluating the Role and Function of 
Civil Society.” 289. 
 84
figure should be appointed as chairman/president of any TRC with the firm backing of 
the government leadership of the country. Similarly, a locally appointed body of a 
commission such as the one in South Africa could be utilized as an effective mechanism 
to pacify the nationalist upheavals against truth findings in post-conflict scenarios. 
In order to maintain cohesiveness in its final report, a TRC would have to 
conclude its findings at the earliest possible time with sufficient staff. Drafting should 
link with the dissemination plan and it should be open to the public. Similarly, for greater 
information, the salient aspects of the TRC report should be compiled and disseminated 
to the greater public. Refuting the South African TRC’s practice, a public sector 
publisher should be avoided to safeguard the originality of the content. 
TRC is not a panacea for every transitional justice system in post-conflict 
countries. Similarly, it is not a one-size-fits-all solution to every type of ethnic conflict. 
Therefore, in every conflict a locally-designed conflict resolution mechanism is 
important, and the international actors can provide technical and financial support for its 
conduct.  
The South African TRC, with its broad mandate and wide coverage, instantly 
grabbed the world’s attention. Similarly, its “open victim hearing” process has brought a 
new dimension to the transitional justice process. This paradigm shift of truth-telling 
became a model that later influenced many counties. By appointing the South African 
TRC, President Mandela avoided any future backlash as a result of the Victor’s Peace in 
South Africa. Moreover, the commission successfully disclosed the atrocities of the 
apartheid regime to global attention and eased the suffering of many survivors of the 
country. The commission not only brought the recognition on its own, but also put South 
Africa on top of the world’s political sphere. Similarly, the TRC process significantly 
influenced the prevailing peace among the racial groups in the country. This security 
attracted many foreign investments and linked South Africa to the global financial 
network to become the second-largest economy in the region. Additionally, as a united 
country, currently South Africa is the third strongest military force in the African 
continent. 
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Apart from these positive indicators, the TRC could not adequately support the 
majority of the apartheid victims, mainly by reparation or prosecution of perpetrators. 
After finalizing its report, the commission had no mandate to monitor or influence 
government for implementation of the TRC’s recommendations. Similarly, the 
government largely ignored the commission’s report mainly to maintain its political 
support from alleged perpetrator groups. However, social groups that bore out of the TRC 
continuously voiced against the government’s inaction and continued the struggle where 
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V. QUEST FOR THE RECONCILIATION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The reconciliation of the Tamils and Sinhalese will depend not on 
constitutional guarantees but on the goodwill, common sense and 
humanity of the government in power and the people who elected it. 
—Lord Soulbury370 
After a comprehensive examination of the causes and consequences of the Sri 
Lankan conflict, along with the ongoing efforts of the Sri Lankan government and other 
stakeholders, it is desirable to provide recommendations for a meaningful reconciliation 
among the Sinhalese and Tamils in the country. Similarly, the South African TRC 
provides much needed inputs to the Sri Lankan context, including drawbacks that could 
be useful to policymakers as they devise a new framework to curb the longstanding 
national question in Sri Lanka. 
This particular investigative study converged on a few major questions: is 
reconciliation possible in Sri Lanka? How do different societies within Sri Lanka feel 
about the reconciliation? This last question must be answered through the lenses of the 
Sinhalese and Tamils, while still addressing the Muslims and the international 
community’s perspectives. After looking at the unfolding of events since the beginning of 
the Sri Lankan conflict, it could be argued that a meaningful reconciliation is possible if 
the Sri Lankan government can devolve power within an acceptable framework to all 
communities while providing good governance. However, to do so, the government will 
need the unbiased involvement of the international community. Thus, this chapter will 
evaluate the current status of the reconciliation process in Sri Lanka, mainly studying the 
perspectives of the Sinhalese, the Tamils, the Muslims, and the international community. 
Subsequently, the study will draw out the existing challenges posed by these 
stakeholders. Next, I will point out relevant aspects of the South African TRC to use in 
the Sri Lankan context before making recommendations to both national and 
international stakeholders. 
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A. STATUS OF THE RECONCILIATION 
More than seven years after the defeat of the LTTE, Sri Lanka has made slow but 
steady progress toward reconciliation among the Sinhalese and Tamils in the country. 
Although successive governments have rebuilt a significant amount of infrastructure in 
the war-ravaged North and East, some underlying problems have remained. As a result, 
both the Sinhalese and Tamils live with mistrust and desperation, a situation that risks the 
re-emergence of violations in the country. Nationalist elements of both communities, 
along with their politicians, have intensified this societal gap, while many other spoiler 
groups have gradually hindered the progress of the reconciliation process. Similarly, 
international actors have pressured the government to address its accountability on past 
human rights violations and provide a political solution mainly through a power 
devolution, which infuriated the Sinhala nationalist masses. Similarly, the Tamils 
mobilized their forces to increase international pressure, but barely negotiated on core 
issues of the conflict. The current government’s commitment to resolve this issue brought 
a fair amount of international appreciation, yet the local political atmosphere ultimately 
restricts these policymakers. In this context, the following study highlights how each 
community views a possible reconciliation and details their fundamental differences. 
1. Tamil Perception 
Generally speaking, the Tamils are using the government’s reconciliation effort as 
an opportunity to win the demands that they had lost with the defeat of the LTTE. While 
appreciating the liberal reforms, the Tamil community has criticized the government for 
not taking substantial efforts to decentralize power, de-militarize, and conduct an 
international inquiry into the alleged human rights violations in the country. Similarly, 
Tamil political leadership is increasingly relying on the international community to 
pressurize the government to achieve these demands. The prevailing suspicion and the 
mistrust of the Tamils about the Sinhalese are continuing in the absence of a meaningful 
dialogue between these communities at the grass-roots level. Thus, it has badly hampered 
any reconciliation effort. Meanwhile, the Tamil diaspora and the South Indian Tamil 
politicians have continued their demand for a separate Tamil state, or an Eelam, in Sri 
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Lanka. It is apparent that, apart from other grievances, all these Tamil parties use the 
devolution and transitional justice as the main conditions for a meaningful reconciliation 
with the Sinhalese government.  
In the 2015 presidential elections, the Tamils overwhelmingly voted to bring the 
new unity government to power, mainly due to its manifesto on bringing reconciliation 
and justice for the conflict and the community. Close to two years in office, the unity 
government made substantial progress toward reconciliation. Apart from addressing the 
basic issues of the Tamils who live in the North and the East, the government has brought 
many liberal reforms to improve the standard of good governance in the country. Peace 
and policy makers have availed the governments’ liberal democratic strategy to intensify 
their activities in the country. As a result, these groups have brought the Tamil’s 
grievances to international attention to increase influence on the Tamil’s demands. While 
it appreciates the government’s efforts, the Tamil community is concerned about issues 
such as the devolution of power through federalism, the military’s presence in Jaffna, 
land issues, accountability on past human rights violations, Tamil women’s rights issues, 
the repeal of the PTA, rising poverty, and poaching of the Indian fishermen in Sri Lankan 
waters. 
Apart from these concerns, the Tamil diaspora has continued to push for its goal 
of separatism and de-militarization. Similarly, these diaspora groups have strongly 
lobbied against the Sri Lankan government in global events, and a recent referendum 
among the Tamils living in North America and Europe demonstrated that close to 100 
percent agreed for a Tamil separate state in Sri Lanka.371 Meanwhile, the south’s Indian 
states of Tamil Nadu, along with the Indian central government, have continuously 
pressured the Colombo’s administration for full implementation of the 13th Amendment 
to the Constitution. While they ignore the Darusman report’s accusation of LTTE’s 
human rights violations from the past, the Tamil diaspora groups, along with the Tamil 
Nadu political parties, vigorously campaign for a Hybrid court system to address the 
government’s accountability aspect.  
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TNA, the main political party of the Sri Lankan Tamils, has rightly positioned 
itself at the vacuum created by the LTTE. However, some segments of the Tamil 
community perceive an increased vulnerability in the absence of their militant group, 
while others reject this idea and blame the LTTE for the present plight of their 
community. Despite these different opinions, scholars generally view the LTTE’s defeat 
as a setback on the part of the Sri Lankan Tamils and the Tamil diaspora.372 However, 
TNA, along with its strong propaganda machine, has successfully mustered the 
international support to pressure the Sri Lankan government for the devolution of power, 
de-militarization of the North and East, and international organization of the TRC 
process. Similarly, some Tamil politicians play a blame game over the government’s 
effort while promoting their personal agendas to stir agitation among the Sinhalese 
nationalist masses. The Northern chief minister organized the “Ezhuga Tami (rise up 
Tamils)” rally as one such incident. The TNA also sponsored an annual LTTE’s “heroes’ 
day” commemoration event, which came under heavy criticism from the Sinhalese 
nationalist elements. As a result of these acts, most Sinhalese in the south have perceived 
Tamils’ aspirations as only directing to the separatism. Similarly, a re-emergence of the 
LTTE has become a distant possibility, yet, in the absence of a meaningful reconciliation, 
the further polarization of the Tamils and Sinhalese becomes inevitable. In this context, 
ultra-radicalized Tamil groups could commence violence against the government 
administration in the North and East. 
Above all, there had not been any meaningful dialogue among the Tamils and the 
Sinhalese about the reconciliation.373 This non-engagement at the community level has 
increased the mistrust among the Sinhalese and Tamils. Although many social groups are 
initiating different cultural and sports activities to build a consensus between the two 
communities, a national policy is required to build a meaningful dialogue, with support 
from the government and non-government organizations. This reconciliation is about 
                                                 
372 Eranda Jayawickrama, “ Triumphalism, fear and humiliation: The psychological legacy of Sri 
Lanka’s civil war,” Taylor and Francis Online, 2010, accessed November 04, 2016, 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17467586.2010.531031.  
373 Malinda Senevirathna, “NPC Resolution is both a threat and an opportunity,” Daily Mirror, April, 
08, 2016. 
 91
“mutual acknowledgement of pain and losses, the shared responsibility for a broken 
relationship and felt need for repair born out of interdependence, recognition and 
commitment to common destiny.”374However, a large part of the Tamil community 
worries about the uncertain future in the reconciliation process due to the growing 
distrust among two communities and the triumphalist mindset of the Sinhalese radical 
elements. Moreover, the Tamil’s fear that post-war Sinhalese triumphalism could further 
marginalize them on the island. 
In contrast, Tamil ministers in the coalition government are reasonably satisfied 
with the government’s efforts on reconciliation. This is mainly due to its establishment of 
the OMP and the Office of the National Unity and Reconciliation (ONUR), which carry 
out its island-wide public opinion survey on reconciliation. Similarly, these politicians 
place their confidence in the government’s constitutional reform process, which can be 
identified as a positive indicator to solve the national issue. Power sharing between the 
Sinhalese and the Muslims at the Eastern Provincial Council is another healthy indicator 
of reconciliation. 
Though there is substantial evidence available to prove an honest effort of the 
government in the reconciliation process, many Tamil’s are not satisfied due to some 
unresolved issues on the ground. Meanwhile, in the absence of a meaningful dialogue 
between two communities, the reconciliation efforts of the government have a limited 
effect. 
2. Sinhalese Perception 
Paradoxically, the Sinhalese political leadership is currently divided over their 
perception of the reconciliation process. While the government is planning for 
decentralization through constitutional reforms, JO, along with the Sinhalese nationalist 
lobby, are opposed to this move, citing “constitutional ethnocide,”375 or giving into the 
Tamil’s demands. As a result, this political division has created a clear difference in 
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opinion about the reconciliation among the Sinhalese. Some view power devolution in 
any form as an appeasement of the Tamils, whereas others favor limited power sharing 
under a unitary state. The defeat of the LTTE has created a triumphalist attitude in the 
minds of some Sinhalese and they aligned with the nationalist groups that supported a 
united Sri Lanka and its security forces. Additionally, due to prevailing mistrust and the 
continuous demand for separation by the Tamil diaspora groups, the Sinhalese are 
reluctant to share a substantial amount of power with the Tamil political leadership. 
Additionally, the group perceives the international transitional justice process as biased 
and a betrayal of their security forces. Thus, the Sinhalese nationalist lobby has 
vehemently opposed any type of power sharing because they view it as putting the 
country’s sovereignty in danger. Yet, due to their religious obligations, many Sinhala-
Buddhists have acknowledged the Tamils’ grievances and accepted a meaningful 
reconciliation as the way forward. 
During three decades of the armed conflict in the country, the Sinhalese 
population suffered an equal amount of atrocities at the hands of the LTTE. Continuous 
manipulation by the Tamil politicians and the LTTE during past negotiation attempts has 
created mistrust and suspicion of the Tamils in the Sinhalese mind. Similarly, ultra-
nationalist political elements have successfully deepened this communal gap and 
generated anti-Tamil sentiments among some segments of the Sinhalese community. 
Apart from their mass protests and rhetoric against the Tamils, Sinhalese civil society has 
largely refrained from physical violations to the Tamils since Black July. 
Victory against the LTTE brought a sense of pride to the Sinhalese and security 
from the constant violence of the LTTE infused nationalism. Soldiers who fought against 
the Tamil militancy were regarded as “national heroes” and the Sinhalese perceived the 
war as a “just war.”376 Sinhalese politicians gradually transferred this triumphalist 
mindset to the masses and gathered popular support along ethnic lines. Although the 2015 
election brought a liberal government into power, nationalist elements are capable of 
mobilizing the masses on any day against the government’s reforms that threaten either 
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the security forces or the sovereignty of the country. As a result, the majority of the 
Sinhalese are opposed to a UN engineered truth-finding commission and a federal 
solution because they perceived this as betrayal of security forces and the country.  
Similarly, a majority of the Sinhalese have argued the rationale behind this 
commission due to its biased prosecution attempts. Incidentally, all U.N. allegations are 
focused on the final stage of the armed conflict and are mainly concerned with the Tamil 
killings, whereas the equal number of Sinhalese and Muslim killings at the hands of the 
LTTE for the past 27 years were not considered. Similarly, if this commission is 
preceded, it would have only the Sri Lankan military leaders for its prosecution, since the 
complete LTTE leadership has either been dead or hiding among the Tamil diaspora. 
Paradoxically, due to its favoritism over the Tamils since the beginning of the conflict, 
the majority of the Sinhalese are skeptical about international involvement. Additionally, 
there is a clear division about international support among the Sinhalese: one group 
favors the view of the countries that supported the defeat of the LTTE and took the side 
of the country in international allegations, while others favor the view of the Western 
countries that promoted good governance. 
Due to its appeasement to Tamil demands, the members of the Joint Opposition 
(JO) demand for a referendum for newly designed constitution reforms, while pledging 
their veto for a two-third majority to pass it. Additionally, the residual fear of a Tamil 
militancy is entrenched in the Sinhalese mind. Consequently, in the face of south Indian 
Tamil hegemony, the Sinhalese view them as a regional minority without an alternative 
settlement in the world. Thus, these groups’ perceptions reflect that a substantial power 
sharing agreement with the Tamils has become a remote possibility. 
In contrast to the Sinhala nationalists views, the majority of the Sinhalese 
recognize the Tamils’ grievances as legitimate and worthy of a permanent solution. 
Similarly, Sinhala-Buddhists, who cultivate tolerance and forgiveness on the basis of 
Buddhist teachings, promote the same values to build reconciliation among the Tamils by 
educating the Sinhalese society. Since the beginning of the armed conflict, Buddhists 
fundamentally denied the Sri Lankan conflict as an ethnic conflict, but perceived it as a 
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terrorist problem; thus, in the absence of the LTTE, any attempt towards reconciliation 
could win the support of the majority of the Buddhist community.377 
Additionally, Sinhalese in the South demonstrated their willingness to empathize 
with the Tamil community on a number of occasions: during the aftermath of the 2004 
tsunami, for the internally displaced Tamils after the armed conflict in 2009, and for the 
flood victims of the North and East in 2014, 2015, and 2016; in all these events, ordinary 
Sinhalese immensely assisted the Tamil victims, moving beyond ethnic divisions. Apart 
from this, security forces in the north and east support the Tamil community in many 
ways: infrastructure development, medical assistance, financial and material assistance 
for underprivileged groups, community projects, and disaster relief assistance. Although 
many Tamil politicians make direct accusations against the military for these efforts, 
ordinary Tamil citizens favor the military’s involvement over the regional administration 
due to their efficiency and lack of corruption.378  
In the absence of a national dialogue towards reconciliation in the country, many 
Sinhalese social groups, along with religious leaders, conducted a substantial amount of 
confidence-building measures through cultural activities, arts exhibitions, sports 
activities, and youth interaction programs. During these events, participants of both 
communities had the opportunity to express their views on reconciliation; finally, they 
delivered a collective message by understanding each other’s point of view. Apart from 
civil society, the Ministry of Cultural Affairs (MCA) and the National Youth Service 
Council (NYSC) have conducted many reconciliation-focused, state-sponsored events in 
the north and east. All of these events resemble Sinhalese willingness for reconciliation 
and their total rejection of the violence in the country. 
Behind this backdrop, although they are opposed to a direct threat for the 
country’s sovereignty and armed forces, a majority of the Sinhalese are amicable and 
willing to reach a mutually-agreed upon solution to the Sri Lankan conflict.  
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3. Muslim Perception 
The Muslims are basically playing a waiting game in the reconciliation process. 
Consequently, they are insisting on their participation and inclusion in any form of power 
sharing in the country, with equal concessions with the Tamils. Yet, they distanced 
themselves from Tamil politics due to the cordial relationship with the Sinhalese political 
leadership. Similarly, Muslims are skeptical about reconciliation between the Sinhalese 
and the Tamils, since they view both parties as not compromising to each other’s 
demands. In recent times, Muslim politicians have campaigned against the Tamils’ 
forceful occupation of their lands in the Jaffna and brought it to national attention. The 
increased radicalized activities in the East have added separatist sentiments among these 
groups. 
The second minority party to be highly discriminated against at the hands of the 
LTTE is the Muslims who lived in the north and east. As a result of the LTTE’s atrocities 
and forced eviction from the North and East, Muslims consider themselves a distinct 
religious and ethnic group in the country, which many correspondents believe was a 
negative move by the Muslim politicians.379 Their main political party, SLMC, acts as a 
“kingmaker” by aligning with the Sinhalese political parties to form the governments, 
while “adopting moderate standpoints in return for ministerial portfolios and associated 
patronage.”380 As a result of the anti-Muslim riots carried out by the hardline Sinhalese 
nationalist elements in 2014, the majority of Muslims view their rights in the country to 
be protected by giving equal attention as to the Tamil.381 Similarly, the community 
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demands enhanced lows against hate speeches by other ethnic groups against the Muslim 
religion and its ideologies. 
The internally displaced Muslims who had been expelled by the LTTE are still 
languishing in the IDP centers, while few of them are moving back to their original lands, 
thereby creating a rift between the Tamils in the North and East. Many Muslim IDPs 
accuse the government and the Tamil political leadership of turning a blind eye to their 
problems by concentrating only on the Tamil’s issue. Many scholars view the continuous 
power struggle among the Muslim political leadership in the past as one of the major 
factors in Muslims being excluded from peacemaking efforts in the country.382 However, 
at present, Muslim political leadership has increasingly focused on maintaining its 
regional power at the Muslim-heavy Eastern province, while rejecting the Tamil’s 
demand for a merger of the North and East.383 Additionally, Muslims reiterate of their 
inclusion in any form of power sharing deal to the conflict, by claiming their role as a 
part of a solution and not as an additional problem in the making. Scholars warn that, if 
ignored as they were in the past, both the Sinhalese and Tamil political leadership pose a 
possible threat of Muslim radicalization in the Eastern province, along with increased 
global influence by other Islamic jihadi groups.384  
4. International Perspective 
Generally speaking, the international community has seen a window of 
opportunity for a meaningful reconciliation with the unity government of Sri Lanka. 
Thus, these groups differently reacted to the ongoing government efforts. As a result of 
the government’s liberal reforms, these international actors became increasingly involved 
in Sri Lankan conflict by applying politico-economic pressure on the government, in 
exchange of reforms for reliefs. Many Western nations and the UN organization 
continued to persuade the government to address the power sharing, demilitarization, and 
a credible investigation for alleged human rights violations at the final stage of the arms 
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conflict. However, the U.S. government has maintained a more liberal approach towards 
the Sri Lankan government. Amidst increased Western activities, China has continued its 
dominance in the country’s economic sphere while protecting its strategic interest. 
Nevertheless, the majority of the Western countries pledge their support to the 
government for its efforts to address the national issue. 
Many international actors such as India, China, the U.S., the UN, and the EU have 
reacted to the ongoing situation in Sri Lanka in different ways. India is mainly concerned 
about a viable power-sharing model among the Sinhalese and Tamils within a unitary 
state, largely due to the spillover effect of the conflict. Due to the growing pressure in 
Tamil Nadu, the New Delhi government reiterates the importance of the investigation of 
the alleged human rights violations of the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government forces at 
the final stage of the armed conflict. Notwithstanding its demands, the Indian government 
initiated a number of post-conflict rebuilding activities in Sri Lanka. Construction of a 
800 million USD northern railway track and 208 million USD worth of housing projects 
to support 50,000 Tamil families in Jaffna are a few important Indian ventures.385 
Although it plays a silent role in the reconciliation process, India is one of the decisive 
factors in any form of a solution to the conflict; whether it is devised internally or 
internationally. 
China, on the other hand, wants to increase its economic activities in post-conflict 
Sri Lanka. Many observers view Chinese involvement in Sri Lanka as a part of its Indian 
Ocean strategy “to facilitate trade and secure China’s energy imports.”386Today, China is 
the largest investor, top government lender, and the leading trade partner of Sri Lanka.387 
However, while supporting Sri Lankan government decisions on the conflict, the Beijing 
government is concerned about the increased Western involvement in the country. The 
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recent response of the Chinese government indicates economic development as a solution 
to the conflict rather than a Western advocated transitional justice system. 
As for the United States government, post-conflict Sri Lanka is viewed as a mixed 
bag of hope and potential. While re-aligning its much strained relationship with the 
previous Sri Lankan government, the U.S. expects the Colombo administration to be 
more “open, moderate, and nonaligned to encourage its territorial integrity and domestic 
institutions, and to stimulate social and economic development through better 
partnerships.”388 While it appreciates the commitments of the present Sri Lankan 
government, the U.S. has perceived the Colombo administration for investigations into 
alleged human rights abuses. However, by realizing the country’s internal political 
dimensions, U.S. policymakers allow the Sri Lankan government to conduct these 
investigations under a credible domestic mechanism.389 Similarly, Washington maintains 
a soft approach towards the Sri Lankan government’s slow but steady pace towards 
reconciliation. 
Apart from partner countries, the UN and E.U. use political pressure and 
economic incentives to bolster the reconciliation process in post-conflict Sri Lanka. The 
Sinhalese nationalist lobby considers these organizations’ role as a “western conspiracy” 
and China claimed that their involvement is “infringement of [country’s] sovereignty.”390 
In addition to its fresh bid for international participation during the alleged human rights 
violation investigations, the U.N. acts as the main leverage between the Tamils and Sri 
Lankan government. Due to its ratification of the resolution adopted in the UNHRC in 
2015, the Sri Lankan government implemented many reforms to improve the country’s 
human rights standards. Similarly, the experts and policymakers of the organization are 
working with the Sri Lankan government to improve its political institution to establish 
good governance. The 27 years of armed conflict have seriously weakened the 
democratic governance in the country.  
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Meanwhile, using its trade leverage, the E.U persuades the Sri Lankan 
government towards good governance. Based on the country’s improved human rights 
standards and trade policies, the EU lifted the fishing ban on the country in 2016 and 
advised the government to replace the current PTA to obtain once-lost GSP plus benefits 
for the country’s garment sector. These results indicate that the UN and EU are 
deliberately using the sagging Sri Lankan economy as leverage to force the government 
to implement reconciliation policies. Apart from these organizations, many Western 
countries and NGOs pledged their support to the Sri Lankan government for its 
reconciliation efforts. 
In retrospect, the current international perceptions of the Sri Lankan issue indicate 
two main aspects: increased involvement and a renewed Western relationship. Therefore, 
the Sri Lankan government and Tamil community should be able to accept the new 
prospects as an opportunity and not as a threat. Similarly, politicians of both communities 
will have to develop a broader awareness campaign among the ultra-nationalist groups 
about the latest international involvement.  
B. FUTURE CHALLENGES FOR THE RECONCILIATION PROCESS 
Following the study of different perspectives of the stakeholders in the conflict, 
there are a number of challenges to reconciliation that can be identified between the 
Sinhalese and Tamils. Although most of these challenges existed since the beginning of 
the armed conflict, past reconciliations failed to address these issues substantially. 
Although successive governments had looked into these issues in different magnitude, 
Tamil political parties still claimed those efforts to be inadequate. 
1. Devolution of Power 
Power sharing is one of the main root causes in the Sri Lankan conflict. There had 
been a few modules proposed by the stakeholders in the conflict, but none of these 
measures were able to convince the other party, mainly due to the power politics in the 
country. While Tamils, along with India, prefer a federal solution, the Sinhalese political 
parties were opposed to this idea mainly due to the substantial power vested in this 
module. In its latest attempt, the Sri Lankan government is reforming the constitution to 
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devolve power within an undivided country. However, so far the government has not 
indicated its desired module, and the Tamil political parties have not shown any sign of 
compromise of their stance. If this political stalemate continues, Sri Lanka cannot achieve 
a meaningful reconciliation between the Sinhalese and the Tamils.  
2. Militarization and Insecurity 
Since the end of the armed conflict, the Sri Lankan government has maintained its 
level of fore in the North and East due to some important reasons. Apart from its 
humanitarian de-mining efforts, the military is mainly involved in infrastructure 
development in the region. Moreover, recent failed attempts of LTTE remnant leadership 
to revoke their violence had prompted the government to bolster the security in the 
region. However, Tamil political parties and the international actors view the military’s 
presence as the government’s deliberate effort for militarization. As a result, these groups 
demanded the Sri Lankan government to either thin out or completely remove the 
military from the region by making alleged claims on security forces for human rights 
violations.391 In response, the government barred the military from getting involved in 
civilian organizations and largely deploying police in the area. Ironically, the ordinary 
Tamil people have a positive perception of the military, mainly due to the continuous 
humanitarian assistance they received from the organization. Additionally, the increased 
number of criminal activities carried out by the alleged LTTE groups had made the Tamil 
civilians seek military assistance for their protection. Therefore, if the military been 
removed, the security of the regions could be compromised. Similarly, the government’s 
action could create a stir among the Sinhalese majority. The troop’s continuous presence 
would intensify Tamil political dissent. 
3. Lands Issues 
The military’s occupation in the Tamil’s lands is yet another concern of Tamil 
political groups and international supporters. In recent times, the government had 
released much of these lands to the rightful owners of the regions. Similarly, the 
                                                 
391 International Crisis Group, 15. 
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government relaxed its restrictions on security measures by allowing the locals into 
military designated HSZs, while compensating for the currently occupied civilian 
properties. However, Tamil politicians relentlessly pursued the government for complete 
evacuation of the HSZs of the region. Such a move could once again directly jeopardize 
the country’s security, since all of the HSZ are within the most strategically important 
locations of this region. 
4. Repeal of the PTA 
The Prevention of Terrorism Act has been one of the major issues discussed at 
various levels in the post-conflict Sri Lanka. Under its mandate, PTA provides 
extraordinary powers to security forces. Tamil political parties, along with international 
actors and right groups, demanded a replacement of the act, while the E.U. placed a 
similar condition to grant the GSP plus trade concession. As a result, the government 
announced its willingness to replace the PTA with a watered-down security act. 
However, the main intention behind the Tamil political parties is to bail out most of the 
LTTE detainees who had been convicted under the PTA, which could provide a lifeline 
to the dead terrorist organization. 
5. Economic Challenges 
Despite becoming a middle-income country after the conflict,392 the Sri Lankan 
government currently faces potentially severe economic problems.393 This situation left 
the government to obtain more financial loans with relatively high interest rates.394 
Economists indicate that, “this contributed to high debt, some $4 billion of which is due 
for repayment in 2016, and rating downgrade has made raising new funds more 
expensive.”395 Additionally, due to the relatively weaker mandate it has, the government 
is unable to bring substantial economic reforms to control the government expenditure on 
subsidiaries. Moreover, recent government efforts to establish new financial deals with 
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India came under heavy criticism of the opposition and the nationalist elements. Scholars 
view that, “the loss of popular trust could cause the more politically risky reforms on 
demilitarization, transnational justice, and devolution of power to slip out of reach.”396 
Thus, Sri Lankan’s current economic status poses a formidable challenge to the 
reconciliation process. 
In the context of the individual group perspectives and the challenges at hand, a 
meaningful reconciliation attempt among the Sinhalese, the Tamils, and the Muslims 
would be an enormous task. However, the government’s ongoing efforts have created a 
“political and a social space” for these stakeholders to begin a dialogue to understand 
each other’s experiences and concerns; thus, the most appropriate way is a truth-telling 
process. 
C. IMPLICATIONS OF SOUTH AFRICAN TRC TO SRI LANKA 
Though it has a few unresolved issues, the South African TRC largely kick-
started the reconciliation in the country, and there are many procedures and functional 
aspects that could possibly apply within the Sri Lankan context. The South African 
TRC’s principle argument of “acceptance of the truth—participation in the collective 
memory unearthed by the truth and reconciliation process—contributes to reconciliation,” 
could be equally applicable in the Sri Lankan transitional justice model. As practiced in 
South Africa, the Sri Lankan TRC may have to examine the grievances of all 
communities covering the total period of the armed conflict in the country (1983–2009). 
Although a laborious effort, this process could be greatly beneficial in achieving the 
larger interests of justice and avoiding the possibility of being “fixated on fixing a single 
party” in a war in which multiple forces were engaged.397 
The UNs’ main allegation against the LLRC was “lack [of] independence, 
mandate and witness protection capacity”; thus, the South African TRC provides a 
mechanism to overcome these issues. By following the TRC’s model, Sri Lanka could 
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incorporate a witness protection aspect and equal participation of prominent apolitical 
persons from the Sinhalese, Tamils, and the Muslims as its commissioners. However, to 
achieve the desired results, the mandate of this TRC should be clear and narrow.  
Similar to the South African TRC, the Sri Lankan commission could reach out to 
the international community for financial assistance. This would be possible by 
establishing a TRC with international standards, and hosting an “open truth hearing” with 
grater media coverage. Moreover, an internationally acclaimed commission would 
eventually attract the Tamils’ participation with confidence. 
The amnesty commission with the same subpoena powers as the South African 
TRC could equally be applicable to the Sri Lankan context. Consequently, amnesty 
would largely clear Sri Lankan military from alleged human rights violations. Apart from 
the subjective truth findings, the commission has to incorporate forensic experts and 
social science experts for the subjective truth-finding process. Thus, evidence against any 
perpetrators becomes reliable. Similarly, an amnesty process could act as the influential 
factor to attract the perpetrators of both communities.  
As practiced in South Africa, theologically-based forgiveness could be more 
applicable in the Sri Lankan context, since followers of Buddhism and Hinduism greatly 
practice this principle. Therefore, representatives of these religions could be incorporated 
as members of the commission. 
Apart from these aspects, the TRC must appoint a reparation commission with the 
representatives of all communities. Similarly, the commission should have the power and 
means to compensate the victims without any political interference. 
One of the most important aspects of the Sri Lankan context is the socio-political 
consent for a TRC in the country. Among the constant opposition from the Sinhalese 
majority, this possibility becomes too narrow. Thus, before its operation, the government 
and the TNA will have to conduct a broader awareness campaign among all communities 
about the conduct and mechanism of the TRC. The main theme of this campaign should 
clear the delusion of the community: TRC is not a just a judicial process to prosecute 
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perpetrators for human rights violations; it is has the means to promote reconciliation for 
permanent peace in the country. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Since the beginning of the conflict, there had not been many opportunities 
available for the Sinhalese and Tamils to achieve a lasting solution. The presence of 
LTTE had diminished the last hope of achieving reconciliation among the two 
communities. However, in the present context, there is a window of opportunity available 
for all communities, but any attempt to build an understanding among the major 
stakeholders to the conflict requires careful planning with greater awareness of the socio-
political aspects of the country. The following recommendations are suggested based on 
the current situation and keep the sensitive nature of each actor’s concern in mind. 
Additionally, these recommendations address the stakeholders who are directly 
challenging the success of the reconciliation process.  
(1) To the Tamils, Specifically the Tamil Political leadership 
 Maintain accommodation, tolerance, and compromise to honor the 
Sinhalese and Muslims’ perceptions on power sharing under a unitary 
state. 
 Immediately stop raising emotions among the Tamils, which leads them to 
hate the Sinhalese. 
 Immediately stop spreading false allegations against the government 
forces and the reconciliation efforts in the North and East. 
 Accept Sri Lankan forces as a common and legitimate force of the county 
that equally represents the Tamil community. 
 Accept the indispensable nature of some of the lands that are occupied by 
the military due to their security value. 
 Negotiate with the GOSL over redistribution or reparation for lands seized 
from the Sinhalese and Muslims in 1991.  
 Declare a ten-year regional development plan and publically request the 
government to provide necessary funds and allocations for the benefit of 
Tamil war widows and the children of the North and East. 
 105
 Immediately discontinue the support to the LTTE remnants in the North-
East and the Tamil diaspora. 
 Increase direct participation on nationally-important matters that affect all 
communities (specifically, the opposition leader R. Sampanthan).  
(2) To the Tamils, Specifically the Tamil Diaspora: 
 Desist from demanding a separate state for the Tamils in Sri Lanka. 
 Renounce the LTTE’s brutality against the Sinhalese, Muslims, and 
Tamils and its repression of dissent within the Tamil community.398 
 Accept power sharing under a unitary state. 
 Admit the LTTE’s human rights violations against the Tamils in the final 
stage of the armed conflict. 
 Support and cooperate with the investigations against alleged LTTE 
violence during the transitional justice process. 
 Support Sri Lankan reconciliation efforts through a broader dialogue with 
the government. 
(3) To the Sinhalese, Specifically the Government of Sri Lanka: 
 Adopt a national policy on reconciliation to foster a sense of togetherness 
among the communities. 
 Immediately commence a dialogue between the Sinhalese, Tamils, and 
Muslims at the regional level to build unity based on mutual 
understanding, recognition, and trust. 
 Bring constitution reforms through a referendum by gaining the two-thirds 
majorities in the Parliament to share power in a favorable manner for all 
other communities. Additionally, new constitutional reforms on 
devolution should be aimed to unify the diverse society, building national 
integration. 
 Bring constitutional reforms to strengthen the judiciary and law 
enforcement agencies to curb corruption and improve transitional justice. 
 Establish a locally designed TRC to address the human rights violations 
from the period of 1983–2009. 
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 Create a conducive environment for all social groups to conduct 
community-sponsored programs, including cultural festivals, arts, music, 
and multi religious ceremonies. 
 Conduct an international symposium with the participation of NGOs, 
INGOs, and human right groups to educate and clarify the military’s role 
in the North and East. 
 Release all possible lands (without jeopardizing national security) in the 
North and East to their rightful owners, including the lands that belong to 
the Sinhalese and the Muslims presently occupied by the Tamils. 
Similarly, compensate for the security-sensitive lands that are occupied by 
the military. 
 Declare a national day to commemorate all communities that were 
affected by the conflict. Additionally, build a reconciliation monument as 
a symbol of peace. 
 Include reconciliation as a separate subject in the school curriculum. 
Teaching can be started at the primary level, and extra credit should be 
awarded to those students who excel in this subject. 
 Increase the number of Sinhalese and Tamil government officials in the 
North and South institutions, respectively. Similarly, government 
documents should be published in all three languages: Sinhala, Tamil, and 
English. 
 Find a permanent solution with the Indian government against illegal 
poaching in Northern Sri Lankan waters, and create a conducive 
environment for the Sinhalese and Tamil fishermen to conduct fishing in 
their traditional sea beds in the northern seas. 
 Commence a meaningful dialogue with the Tamil diaspora and absorb 
them into the reconciliation process. 
 Commence large-scale investment in the North and East with the 
assistance of local and foreign investors and the business community to 
address the region’s underdevelopment. 
(4) To the Sinhalese, Specifically to the Sinhalese nationalist lobby: 
 Accept power sharing with the Tamils in a unified state. 
 Move away from party politics and act as a unified force to persuade the 
government toward good governance. 
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(5) To the Muslims, Specifically the Muslim political leadership: 
 Give a viable option to Muslims in the proposed power-sharing plan. 
 Denounce the radicalized Muslims’ demand for a separate state in the 
Eastern province. 
 Participate in a locally-designed transitional justice process. 
(6) To the International Community: 
 Provide technical and judicial advice during the transitional justice process 
by accepting a locally-designed panel of commissioners. Similarly, accept 
the grievances of all communities in the time frame from 1983 to 2009 for 
the TRC. 
 Refrain from exerting unnecessary pressure on the government for quick 
reforms due to the country’s current political atmosphere. 
 Provide financial assistance to develop the North and East. 
 Release immediate humanitarian aid in the amount of 70 million USD that 
a donor pledged in 2006. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Seven years after pulling off an impressive military victory, Sri Lanka has yet to 
achieve permanent peace in the country. If post-independence had reflected a country 
with great hopes and prosperity, early assessments turned out to be hopelessly optimistic. 
The two major ethnic groups, the Sinhalese and the Tamils, simmer their tensions over 
distribution of resources and goods and the ideological direction of the country. Once 
these tensions took to the streets, political differences deepened and each felt itself to be 
the genuinely aggressive party. As the political system embraced the nationalist path, 
conflict turned into a fully-fledged war that has proved enormously costly. The bloody 
conflict between the LTTE and the government of Sri Lanka has grabbed international 
attention due to the devastation and spillover effects.  
Repeated attempts to bring a permanent solution to the conflict had failed, mainly 
due to the maxima list of aspirations of both communities. Once liberal peace efforts 
turned to shambles, both LTTE and the GOSL resorted to the “war for peace” strategy, 
which ultimately eclipsed the Tamil Tigers from the contention. The much-anticipated 
reconciliation after the arms conflict was seen as a distance prospect once the government 
came under the international microscope for its alleged human rights violations and 
dragged its feet on the core issues of the conflict; yet with an impressive re-building 
process. Once nationalism overwhelmed with a collective political effort, a historical 
coalition government with increased international support came to power with much hope 
for reconciliation in the country. Amid substantial efforts toward a good governance and 
national concession, Tamil political leadership, along with the international community, 
asked for more actions in quick succession. Thus, the reconciliation was once again 
pushed to a complex situation with little hope for becoming a reality.  
These unfolding situations prove my hypothesis: the success of a meaningful 
reconciliation in the Sri Lankan context is mainly dependent on the political 
accommodation, tolerance, and compromise of both the Tamils and the Sinhalese. Hence, 
there need to be genuine attempts from all sides to reduce the gaps and cement the fault 
lines that divide communities in Sri Lanka. Similarly, while absorbing some important 
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aspects from the South African TRC process, Sri Lanka, too, can form an indigenous 
truth-finding commission to investigate much-demanded alleged human rights violations 
in the armed conflict because a direct international intervention would meet with stiff 
resistance from the Sinhalese nationalist lobby, further alienating two societies. 
Consequently, it is understood that, “reconciliation is both a process and a goal. Hence, it 
will necessarily require time to bear fruit. Reconciliation cannot be imposed or forced on 
a nation as an event. It requires both a strategy and systematized response mechanism by 
the state and other stakeholders to deal with the likely obstacles that will emerge along 
the way.”399 Thus, in post-conflict Sri Lanka, reconciliation between the Sinhalese and 
the Tamils is possible, provided they bridge the gap to negotiate their own obstacles.  
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